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Objective: Limited research has examined perpetrator induced trauma symptoms in offender 
populations.  The aim of the current study was to examine offenders’ memories about their crimes, 
and explored potential factors involved in the experience of intrusive memories.  Method:  One 
hundred adult male offenders serving provincial sentences completed a questionnaire package 
examining offence-related shame, guilt, instrumentality-reactivity, psychopathy, and memory 
characteristics.  This cross-sectional design relied solely on participant self-reports.  Results: 
Forty-three percent of the sample reported experiencing intrusive memories of a crime they 
committed.  Intrusive memories were experienced across all crime types.  As expected, shame was 
found to be the most significant and accurate correlate of intrusive memories, over and above the 
other primary factors of interest in this study.  Discussion: Findings suggest that a substantial 
number of offenders suffer from intrusive memories about their crimes.  Results are in line with 
theoretical foundations of posttraumatic stress disorder, and are consistent with literature 
examining trauma symptomology in victim, first responder, and veteran populations.  This study 
further demonstrates that the experience of offence-related symptoms like intrusive memories and 
shame are not limited to forensic psychiatric or homicide perpetrator samples.  Enhancing 
knowledge about intrusive memories has important implications with regard to responsivity 
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CHAPTER 1:  
Offenders’ Memories of Their Crimes: Exploring the Factors Involved in the Experience of 
Intrusive Memories 
1.1 General Overview 
Research on voluntary memories (deliberate remembering) has been conducted for 
centuries; however, the study of involuntary memories (spontaneous remembering) is lacking 
(Berntsen, 1996, 2009).  A relatively new area of study is that of offenders’ memories of their 
crimes (Christianson, 2007).  The objective of the current study was to examine the combination 
of the two by exploring offenders’ experiences of persistent and unwanted (also known as 
intrusive) involuntary memories about their own crime(s).  It is of interest to examine these two 
areas together because, although offenders may suffer from intrusive memories (Evans, Ehlers, 
Mezey, & Clark, 2007b), there is little research on this topic.  In recent years, offenders’ 
intrusive memories have more generally been studied in the context of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) (e.g., Gray et al., 2003; Papanastassiou, Waldron, Boyle, & Chesterman, 2004; 
Pollock, 1999; Rogers, Gray, Williams, & Kitchiner, 2000; Spitzer et al., 2001).  Although the 
offender PTSD literature provides some insight into intrusive memories in this population, little 
research has examined the specific factors involved in their development and maintenance.   
The aim of the current study was to explore how three factors (i.e., shame, 
instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, and recall perspective) influence offenders’ experience 
of intrusive memories in relation to their crime.  Although there is research examining certain 
aspects of these three factors (e.g., Budden, 2009; Evans, Ehlers, Mezey, & Clark, 2007a; Evans 
et al., 2007b; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 2010; Robinaugh & McNally, 
2010), there is a dearth of research examining the specific relationship between these factors and 
intrusive memories in an offender context.  Some researchers in the area of offender PTSD have 
identified that trauma symptoms are a potential barrier in correctional treatment programs 
(Martin, Eljdupovic, Colman, Simpson, & McKenzie, 2014), and that PTSD, as well as related 
factors such as shame, are related to risk factors for future violence (Hosser, Windzio, & Greve, 
2008; Kubiak, 2004).  Enhancing knowledge about intrusive memories, and improving the 
ability to identify them in offenders, may inform clinical practice and has important implications 
with regard to reducing offender violence in institutions and in the community.  In this 
dissertation, descriptions of involuntary and intrusive memories are first provided; next, the 
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offender literature examining intrusive memories is highlighted, and the potential factors 
involved in the development and maintenance of intrusive memories in offenders are explored.  
Finally, the current research is described and outlined. Results and a discussion of the findings 
follow. 
1.2 Involuntary Memories 
Ebbinghaus (1964) was one of the first to identify involuntary memories as distinct from 
voluntary memories.  He described involuntary memories as occurring when “mental states once 
present in consciousness return to it with apparent spontaneity and without any act of the will” 
(p. 2).  Berntsen (1996) more recently clarified the meaning of an involuntary autobiographical 
memory as a memory that is apparently not preceded by an attempt at retrieval, and instead is 
brought to consciousness spontaneously.  
 In 1996, Berntsen noted that, remarkably, cognitive psychologists have largely neglected 
studying involuntary memories, and that instead, clinical psychologists have essentially been 
responsible for research in this area.  Cognitive psychologists have tended to focus on voluntary 
memories (i.e., remembering as a controlled and deliberate process; Berntsen, 2010), which are 
more easily studied in the laboratory; however, in the past 10-15 years, there has been an 
increasing number of studies exploring involuntary memories (Berntsen, Staugaard, & Sørensen, 
2013).  The initial paucity in research examining involuntary memories was due to the belief in 
cognitive psychology that involuntary memories are rare.  Recent studies, however, have found 
that involuntary memories are not rare, and are in fact common for even non-traumatic 
experiences (e.g., Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Brewin, 2014a; Kvavilashvili & 
Mandler, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2009).  
 Berntsen (1996, 1998, 2010) and her colleagues (e.g., Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2002; Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014), as well as a few other researchers (e.g., Ball & Little, 
2006; Brewin & Soni, 2011; Mace, 2004, 2005, 2007; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; 
Verwoerd & Wessel, 2007), have studied the phenomena of involuntary memories and  explored 
how such memories may be elicited.  Berntsen (2010) claims that both voluntary and involuntary 
memories operate via the same episodic memory system, and that remembering for both types of 
memory is universal (everybody has them) and frequent (they occur in daily life).  
Autobiographical memory (voluntary and involuntary) is formed by facts about ourselves and 
our past (autobiographical knowledge base), and involves the working self-concept which 
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comprises a set of active goals and self-images (Conway, 2005).  Autobiographical memory 
includes abstract memories, but also consists of more detailed sensory-perceptual information.  
When we recall an event, it is the sensory detail that typically makes the memory feel ‘real’ (like 
it was something actually experienced).  According to Conway (2005), the process of recalling 
such detail, and remembering it, is based on what he calls autonoetic consciousness – the 
capacity to reflect on our thoughts.  This autonoetic consciousness embodies self-awareness, and 
allows for the reflection of episodic memory content.  Rubin and Berntsen (2009) suggest that 
both voluntary and involuntary memories are affected similarly by mechanisms related to 
encoding and maintenance of information in memory, and that recall of past events is predicted 
by the same memory characteristics, such as emotional intensity and significance to life story 
(i.e., the event is relevant to the person’s identity and life events/script).  For example, events 
that change aspects of our life (e.g., going to jail) and/or have strong emotionality to them (e.g., 
committing a violent crime) are likely to be better remembered both voluntarily and involuntarily 
than events that are not emotionally charged or significant to our life (Berntsen, 1996; Conway, 
2005; Mace, 2004).  This relationship between memory and emotion has been coined the 
emotional enhancement effect (Hamann, 2001), whereby emotions are a product of amygdala 
activation, and this activation can allow for consolidation (via more rehearsal and elaboration) of 
emotional experiences relative to more neutral information or experiences (McGaugh, 2004; 
Sharot & Yonelinas, 2008; Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014). 
As noted above, voluntary and involuntary autobiographical memories are believed to 
involve similar mechanisms of encoding and maintenance of information.  Differences between 
these two types of memory are instead explained in terms of their different retrieval mechanisms 
– associative versus strategic recall (Berntsen et al., 2013; Rubin & Berntsen, 2009).  Voluntary 
remembering is strategic and goal directed, and is a process that requires executive functions to 
monitor the search process.  On the other hand, involuntary recall is an associative process, in 
that retrieval of a memory is related to the presentation of an associated stimulus or response.  
Specifically, the associative explanation of memory retrieval is instigated or triggered by an 
associated situational cue that was present at the time of encoding (Berntsen, 2010; Ebbinghaus, 
1964).  As such, involuntary memories reported by individuals tend to have particular 
identifiable cues (e.g., activity, object, person, conversation, sensory experience, feeling, life 
theme), and tend to involve peripheral aspects of the individuals’ environment (Berntsen, 1996, 
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2009; Mace, 2004).  Berntsen (2009) suggests that involuntary memories, which are triggered by 
cues that tend to elicit emotions, exert more emotional impact than voluntary memory.  Although 
the specific type of emotion felt at the time of the involuntary memory is not always congruent 
with the emotion experienced during the past event (e.g., anger felt when remembering vs. fear 
experienced at the time of the event), Berntsen (2009) found that the valence tends to be 
congruent, whereby the valence of the current mood is a predictor of the emotional valence of 
the memory.  For example, although anger and fear are technically different emotions, they are 
both negatively valenced, and this valence is what seems to be consistent between the event and 
the memory of it.  In addition to Berntsen’s findings regarding the connection between the 
valence of mood and memory, Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) found that voluntary and 
involuntary memories differed in terms of the emotional valence of the cues.  Specifically, they 
found that involuntary memories were more likely to be triggered by negative cues (than by 
either positive or neutral cues), whereas cue valence did not have any effect on the likelihood of 
retrieving voluntary memory.  In addition, there was a high correspondence between the 
emotional valence of these cues and emotional valence ratings of both these participants’ 
voluntary and involuntary memories (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).   
 Involuntary memories are predominantly of unusual/distinct events (Berntsen, 2009) and 
this finding is perhaps because of their deviation from everyday scripts or self-concept and the 
degree of emotionality involved.  Berntsen and colleagues (2013) have reported that participants 
experience more involuntary memories in response to unique cues (which are only presented 
once), whereas more voluntary memories are elicited via repeated cues (which are presented 
several times).  Berntsen et al. (2013) suggest that the frequency of involuntary memories in 
response to unique cues relates to the notion of cue overload (informational overlap between cue 
and event), whereby the likelihood of a cue providing access to a given target memory depends 
on the extent to which this cue is uniquely associated with that initial memory.  When the cue 
becomes associated with other memories as well, it becomes more general; thus, its strength for 
triggering involuntary memories declines and it is instead more likely to elicit voluntary recall 
(Berntsen et al., 2013).  This idea of cue uniqueness/distinctiveness relates to the connections 
between emotional valence, script-deviation, and memory.  Specifically, both valence and script-
deviation of the initial memory, and the associated cue, heighten the distinctiveness and 
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relevance of the cue for the individual, which results in the elicitation of more involuntary 
memories.  
In summary, involuntary memories have been identified in the literature as universal, and 
occur as frequently as voluntary memories (Berntsen, 2010).  Involuntary autobiographical 
memories are believed to result from the same episodic memory system (i.e., same basic 
encoding and maintenance mechanisms) as voluntary memories; however, their retrieval 
mechanisms differ (associative retrieval from cues/triggers vs. strategic retrieval).  Involuntary 
memories tend to be distinct in terms of factors relating to their cue-specificity, relevance to their 
life-story/script, and their emotional impact at recall (Berntsen, 2009).  Under normal 
circumstances involuntary memories are not typically stressful or repetitive; however, they have 
the potential to become dysfunctional (Ball & Little, 2006; Berntsen, 2010; Mace, 2007), which 
is discussed in the following section. 
1.3 Intrusive Memories 
Intrusive memories may best be considered as an “anomalous subclass of involuntary 
memories in general” (Berntsen, 1996, p. 450) or as an “extreme manifestation of a possible 
normal function of involuntary memories” (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008, p. 929).  As an 
extreme subclass of involuntary memories, intrusive memories are defined as recurrent, 
distressing, and involuntarily triggered autobiographical memories of a specific event or incident 
that happened at a particular time and at a particular place (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; Evans et al., 2007a; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  It is these repetitive and distressing 
features, and a desire to avoid them, that make intrusive memories stand out as a subclass of 
involuntary memories (Berntsen, 1996; Kvavilashvili, 2014).  
As noted above, cognitive psychologists had, until more recently, neglected examining 
involuntary memories.  Instead, much of the literature in this area was conducted by clinical 
psychologists who explored the relationship between involuntary memories and trauma.  
Specifically, clinical psychologists have largely been studying intrusive memories as a hallmark 
symptom of PTSD (APA, 2013).  Studying intrusive memories in the context of PTSD has 
provided an important platform for understanding the effects of trauma on individuals and has 
led to advances in treatment options to remedy its associated symptoms. That being said, 
although intrusive memories are a core symptom of PTSD, they are also found in individuals 
who do not meet the full criteria for the disorder (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005).  In 
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practice, clinical psychologists explain symptoms by disorders, and have organized clusters of 
symptoms into disorders (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013).  This classification system (e.g., 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-5) has been useful in creating a 
common language for clinical practice and research (Hyman, 2010), but has also limited the 
exploration of the underlying variables/symptoms.  As such, to date there is relatively little 
known about the subjective experience of intrusive memories, and it is important to study these 
symptoms beyond the PTSD diagnosis per se, and consider intrusive memories in the general 
context of autobiographical memory and life events.   
The clinical literature indicates that there are different types of intrusive cognitions (e.g., 
memories, thoughts).  Intrusive memories are distinct from ruminative/intrusive thoughts found 
in disorders such as depression, in that memories are briefer and contain more sensory 
information and detail (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007).  Although 
individuals with depression, eating disorders, anxiety disorders, or bipolar disorder may 
experience intrusive cognitions (for reviews see Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; 
Steel & Holmes, 2007), the term “intrusive memories” itself, only falls under the DSM-5 criteria 
of “intrusion symptoms” for PTSD (APA, 2013).  PTSD is a trauma-and-stressor-related disorder 
that usually occurs after an individual is exposed to threatened death, injury, or violence; and it 
involves the presence of intrusive symptoms and an attempt to avoid associated stimuli, as well 
as negative alterations in cognition and mood (APA, 2013).  Flashbacks are also classified as 
intrusion symptoms in the DSM-5.  The term flashbacks captures intrusive memories that 
specifically involve vivid “re-experiencing” of the incident.   
Immediately following a traumatic event, PTSD symptoms are a common experience for 
many people (Ehlers, 2010), and the presence of intrusive memories can be a sign of a “normal 
adaptation” (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers & Steil, 1995).  Specifically, intrusive replaying of 
trauma in dreams and while awake allows the human mind to covertly rehearse alternative 
responses, and contemplate the overall unpleasantness of the situation, so that avoidance or 
escape from the life-threatening situation becomes more likely if encountered again.  Although 
intrusive memories are common after trauma, many people recover from having these memories 
within a few months (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  For others, these memories can often persist for 
years (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdock, & 
Walsh, 1992).  Intrusive memories can lead to impaired functioning, such as sleep disturbances, 
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irritability, and dysfunction in relationships and employment (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers & 
Steil, 1995). 
 The recurrent and persistent nature of some traumatic memories can be explained as a 
consequence of the enhanced accessibility of the event in autobiographical memory (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2008).  Memory for traumatic events tends to be highly accessible for both involuntary 
and voluntary recall due to a variety of interacting factors (Berntsen, 2009).  One such factor is 
the level of emotion experienced at the time of the event (McGaugh, 2004; Staugaard & 
Berntsen, 2014).  Berntsen (2001) suggests that the distinct impact of traumatic events on 
memory may be due to the severity of the event and consequences related to it.  Voluntary recall 
is guided by our self-schema and, accordingly, this type of recall favors events that are consistent 
with knowledge that is central in our life (Conway, 2005).  On the other hand, events that clash 
with our schematic knowledge are not as easily retrieved voluntarily.  Instead, schema-deviant 
events tend to provide distinctive content that becomes associated with situation-specific cues, 
and, thus, are more likely to be recalled involuntarily (Berntsen, 2010).  As a subclass of 
involuntary memories, memories that tend to become intrusive are most often related to the 
emotional impact of the specific event, and these memories are often accompanied by the same 
original emotional valence as that experienced during the traumatic event (Berntsen, 1996; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Specifically, intrusive memories often consist of stimuli that were 
present right before the traumatic event (Ehlers et al., 2002) or during (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008) 
those moments that had the largest emotional impact.  The interplay and combined effects of cue 
uniqueness and emotion on involuntary recall across time seems central to the development of 
intrusive memories of stressful or traumatic events (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014).  Specifically, 
Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) found that memories of emotional scenes become more 
accessible than memories of neutral scenes over time.  This relationship between emotion and 
time lapse is consistent with the emotional enhancement effect (Hamann, 2001) described earlier, 
whereby longer retention intervals allow for greater consolidation of emotional scenes (due to 
amygdala activation) relative to neutral scenes (McGaugh, 2004; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996; Sharot 
& Yonelinas, 2008; Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014). 
Factors like emotionality and schema-deviance that augment the encoding and 
maintenance of information in memory, enhance the accessibility of traumatic memories relative 
to memories of other autobiographical events, and this accessibility in turn enhances the 
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relevance of external cues and triggers (Berntsen, 2009).  Intrusive memories could be triggered 
by a wide range of stimuli related to the traumatic event, for example: physical cues similar to 
those present shortly before or during the traumatic event (e.g., location, the physique of a 
person, spatial cues, smells, a certain tone of voice), similar emotional states (e.g., feeling 
helpless or scared) or other similar internal cues (e.g., being touched on a certain body part) 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Situational cues vary in content and intensity, therefore, different 
aspects of the same event may come to mind in response to different environmental features 
(Berntsen, 2001, 2009).  Consistent with the claim that involuntary and intrusive memories are 
triggered by sensory cues, the actual content of intrusive memories (including feelings of re-
experiencing the trauma) often consists of sensory experiences that are associated with these 
cues (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Intrusive memories can involve different types of sensations 
including physical impressions, but are predominantly visual in nature (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; van 
der Kolk & Fisler, 1995) and often take the form of brief fragments of the traumatic experience 
(Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Pollock, 1999).  For example, a man who was in a head-on 
motor vehicle collision repeatedly sees headlights coming towards him as he had seen them 
shortly before his collision (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  In this example, the emotion related to the 
vehicle collision was likely fear, and it is probable that a visual cue, such as a bright light, 
triggers the thought of having seen on-coming lights prior to the traumatic collision. 
Experiencing this intrusive memory would associatively involve a negative feeling (e.g., fear or 
anger).   
In conclusion, intrusive memories, such as those observed in individuals following their 
experience of a stressful or traumatic event, therefore may be viewed as a “malignant effect of 
normal mechanisms of involuntary memories” (Berntsen, 1996, p. 435).  Specifically, the 
memories of emotional events become more accessible (due to combined effects of cue 
uniqueness and emotional enhancement), compared to the involuntary retrieval of more 
unremarkable or normal events (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014).   
In these sections above, intrusive memories were described as a subtype of involuntary 
memories, and an introduction into what they are and how they may come about was provided.  
We know that the schema-deviance and the distinctiveness of the event, combined with cue 
uniqueness and emotional enhancement, are central to the development of intrusive memories of 
stressful or traumatic events.  In an attempt to further explain how involuntary memories can 
9 
 
become intrusive (i.e., how they develop and are maintained psychologically), we must draw on 
the available clinical literature which provides useful insight via PTSD. This discussion of 
intrusive memories within theoretical explanations of PTSD is presented below. 
1.3.1 Theoretical Foundations of Intrusive Memories in PTSD  
The literature exploring involuntary memories is largely founded in clinical research that 
studied intrusive memories in the context of PTSD symptomology (APA, 2013; Brewin et al., 
1996).  A number of theories have been proposed over the years to explain how and why PTSD 
develops, such as: Mowrers’ Two-Factor Learning Theory (Mowrer, 1960); the Reappearance 
Hypothesis (Neisser, 1967); the Stress Response Model (Horowitz, 1976); and the Warning-
Signal Hypothesis (Ehlers et al., 2002), to name a few.  The three most prominent current 
theories, Emotional Processing Theory (Foa & Kozak, 1986), Dual Representation Theory 
(Brewin et al., 1996), and the Cognitive Model (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), all draw on much of the 
earlier PTSD work and are widely accepted and empirically supported.  These three theories are 
described below. 
1.3.1.1 Emotional Processing Theory (Foa & Kozak, 1986).   This theory draws on 
Lang’s (1977) work on the informational-processing of fear, which focused on the encoding, 
storage, and recall of fear-inducing events and their associated stimuli and responses.  
Specifically, according to Lang (1977), a fear structure is a network in memory that includes 
information about the feared stimulus situation, information about the verbal, physiological, and 
behavioral responses, and interpretive information about the meaning of the stimulus and 
responses.  Foa and Kozak (1986) highlight that the development of PTSD symptoms is related 
to the meaning of the event, as interpreted by the individual.  For example, it is the information 
regarding danger that violates a person’s formerly held basic concept about safety.  According to 
this theory, an intrusive memory is a distressing memory of an event that is accessed when a 
fearful individual is presented with benign information (e.g., a cue or trigger) that matches the 
information structure in memory.   
Drawing from Lang’s work, Foa and Kozak (1986) propose that how one copes with fear 
responses (i.e., escape or avoidance) depends on his/her degree of emotional processing (the 
interpretation of the fear – i.e., danger or threat).  When fear is realistic, it can be viewed as 
normal and the fear structure provides information about how best to respond to the threat.  
However, when information in the fear structure does not realistically portray the world, and 
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avoidance responses are elicited by harmless stimuli that are perceived as dangerous, then the 
fear structure becomes a problem (Foa & Kozak, 1986).  The fear structure of individuals with 
PTSD is thought to include excessive stimulus and response elements, as well as elements with 
pathological meanings (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998).  Specifically, it has been suggested that the fear 
structures of individuals with PTSD include two basic cognitive distortions that are involved in 
the development and maintenance of these symptoms.  These include the belief that the world is 
a dangerous place and the negative view of the self as incompetent at coping (Foa & Rothbaum, 
1998).   
 Emotional processing theory provides the PTSD literature with an underlying 
conceptualization of how symptoms such as intrusive memories are maintained via fear, and 
introduces the mechanisms required to change this fear and overcome the distressing memories.  
Emotional processing specifically involves a change in the fear structure (i.e., the modification of 
thought structures that underlie the emotion).  This change process involves the initial activation 
of the fear structure (e.g., intrusive memories) combined with the incorporation of corrective 
information that is incompatible with some aspects of the fear structure.  The fear structure can 
be changed and fear reduction can occur via exposure therapy, which involves physiological 
habituation and changes in valence (Rauch & Foa, 2006).  A reduction in symptoms, such as 
intrusive memories, can be achieved through exposure therapy by way of modifying the fear 
structure with corrective information.  This process results in the person being less afraid or 
emotional the next time he or she faces that memory or trigger (Rauch & Foa, 2006).  If a fear 
response is still being elicited, then it suggests that emotional processing has not been 
successfully completed (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Rauch & Foa, 2006).  The 
development and maintenance of PTSD symptomology is a result of the failure to fully process 
the traumatic memory(s).  In other words, individuals who systematically avoid trauma-related 
memories, feelings, and activities do not have the opportunity to experience, and therefore 
integrate, disconfirming information into their minds to challenge the pathological elements and 
distortions (Rauch & Foa, 2006).   
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1.3.1.2 Dual Representation Theory (Brewin et al., 1996, 2010).  In contrast to the 
other prominent theories of PTSD, Brewin and colleagues’ (1996) theory is largely founded in 
memory research.  Brewin et al. (2010) more recently revised the 1996 dual representation 
theory of posttraumatic stress disorder to place it within a neural systems model of healthy 
memory and imagery.1  This revised theory identifies different types of memory processing that 
can occur simultaneously.  These two distinct types of memory systems proposed are contextual 
memory (C- memory) and sensation-based memory (S- memory).  The C-memory (previously 
known as verbally accessible memory – VAM; Brewin et al., 1996) system supports abstract 
declarative representations within their associated autobiographical context.  Representations of 
C-memory, referred to as C-reps, can be accessed both involuntarily and voluntarily, and support 
integration with previous knowledge.  The S- memory system (previously known as situationally 
accessible memory – SAM; Brewin et al., 1996) encompasses representations (referred to as S-
reps) that are closely bound to sensory and affective qualities.  Sensory and physiological aspects 
of the traumatic experience represented in the S-reps are triggered involuntarily by “matching 
inputs” (cues or reminders of the original event) without retrieval of the appropriate 
autobiographical context.   
 From the dual representation perspective, Brewin and colleagues (2010) suggest that 
emotional processing will first involve the creation of an enduring S-rep by an extremely 
emotional or stressful event, combined with an absence of integration with a corresponding C-
rep, and thus a lack of appropriate contextualization for this S-rep.  In other words, flashbacks in 
PTSD involve visual imagery and result from the creation of a strong emotional S-rep without 
the usual association to a corresponding C-rep (i.e., reactivation occurs without reference to the 
encoding context or associated autobiographical knowledge) (Brewin et al., 2010).  Brewin and 
colleagues also propose that exposure treatment, as well as imagery re-scripting techniques, can 
be beneficial in the treatment of PTSD according to their dual representation theory.  In short, 
they suggest that exposure to trauma cues, and the opportunity to reconstruct them with an 
alternative (more positive) outcome, can facilitate the transfer of S-reps into more elaborated C-
reps that can be integrated with existing autobiographical memory.  The integration of C-reps 
                                                 
1 The revised model is concerned with a broader spectrum of visual intrusions occurring across different disorders (Brewin et al., 
2010).  For the purpose of this paper, only Brewin et al.’s discussion of intrusive memories will be described. 
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can then allow for the contextualization of the memories, and a decrease in the spontaneous 
retrieval of negative sensations (Brewin et al., 2010).  
1.3.1.3 Cognitive Model (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  This model draws heavily on some of 
the theories mentioned above (Brewin et al., 1996; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Horowitz, 1976).  The 
cognitive model suggests that PTSD symptoms, such as intrusive memories, persevere when 
individuals process the trauma in a way that is indicative of a threat.  According to Ehlers and 
Clark (2000), the sense of threat arises as a consequence of two processes.   
The first process involves the appraisal of the trauma and its consequences.  People who 
experience intrusive memories are likely to have negative appraisals of the event and create a 
sense of threat that may be external or internal.  An external threat tends to involve 
overgeneralizations or exaggerations (e.g., “the world is a more dangerous place” or “bad things 
always happen to me”), which generate situational fears and avoidant behaviors that in turn 
maintain this overgeneralized fear.  An internal threat relates to how the individual felt or 
behaved during the event, specifically creating a threat to how he or she might otherwise view 
him or herself as an acceptable person who is capable of achievement.  These conflicting beliefs 
or views of the self are best explained by the cognitive dissonance literature (Festinger, 1957), 
whereby a negative state or emotion results from a disconfirmation of an expectation about one’s 
self or the environment.  Examples of internal threats can include appraisals concerning 
responsibility for the traumatic event or its outcome (e.g., “It was my fault” or “I deserve that 
bad things happen to me”), appraisals concerning a violation of important core moral standards 
(e.g., “I did something disgraceful”), and appraisals concerning perceived loss (e.g., “My life 
will never be the same again” or “My personality has changed for the worse”).  A sense of 
internal threat can also come from individual differences in the appraisals of consequences of 
trauma, like experiencing intrusive memories, and the beliefs surrounding that experience 
particularly if they do not consider these symptoms part of the normal coping process (e.g., “I’m 
going crazy” or “I’ll never get over this”).  All of these kinds of negative appraisals maintain the 
presence of intrusive memories by producing negative emotions like anger, anxiety, sadness, or 
shame, and by encouraging dysfunctional coping strategies (i.e., suppression), which 
paradoxically reinforce the symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Cognitive-based treatments for 
trauma symptoms, therefore, seek to ‘correct’ these appraisals in individuals by minimizing or 
removing cognitive dissonance through reappraisal/reframing of the event and related emotions. 
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The second process involves the nature of the memory for the event and its connection to 
other autobiographical memories.  These authors suggest that intrusive memories are driven by 
the fact that the trauma memory is poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated into its context 
(i.e., in time, place, and circumstances) and into other autobiographical memories.  Specifically, 
according to Ehlers and Clark (2000), poor elaboration and integration leads to a weak semantic 
route to retrieval, such that physical cues often lead to unintentionally recalled memories of 
sensory information.  Stimuli present before or during the traumatic event become associated 
with a prediction of threat or danger, and these feelings can be easily re-triggered by external 
physical cues.  Poor elaboration and integration also results in an absence of the link to previous 
and subsequent information or autobiographical memories, such that the person ignores 
contradictory information and does not make logical connections between the feeling of threat 
and the fact that he is actually still alive (i.e., “I did not die”) (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).   
1.3.1.4 Commentary on the theoretical explanations of intrusive memories in PTSD.  
Much of the trauma memory literature, including the theories discussed above, suggests that the 
nature of the trauma memory depends on the quality of processing at encoding (see also Krystal, 
Bennett, Bremner, Southwick, & Charney, 1995; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1997; Siegel, 
1995).  The discussions of dual systems, poor integration, processing failure, and compromised 
encoding in the trauma literature have more recently been challenged by Berntsen (see Berntsen, 
1996, 2001, 2009, 2010; Berntsen & Rubin, 2008).  Specifically, Berntsen has challenged prior 
PTSD theories by suggesting that they all take a special mechanism view (i.e., they all assume 
that encoding of the traumatic event is faulty), and she proposes that they are incorrect in taking 
this view.  Instead, as noted in the involuntary and intrusive memories sections above, Berntsen 
(2009) suggests that involuntary and voluntary memories do not differ in terms of encoding and 
maintenance mechanisms, but rather in terms of retrieval (associative vs. strategic recall), and 
proposes a basic mechanism account of memory.   
Brewin (2014a) more recently attempted to address the debate in the literature 
surrounding the idea of special vs. basic mechanisms in memory for traumatic/emotional events.  
He recognized that both accounts of memory are “equally grounded in a broad appreciation of 
human memory phenomena” (p. 89).  That being said, the special mechanism view stems from 
clinical research on PTSD, and the theories are influenced by the fact that they are couched in 
clinical psychology.  Specifically, they have been influenced by clinical psychology’s distinction 
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between normal and abnormal, and clustering and pathologizing symptoms into specific 
diagnoses (APA, 2013; Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Hyman, 2010).  These theories tend to view 
trauma symptoms as ‘abnormal’ or ‘problematic’ and cluster them as diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD.  As such, the special mechanisms view has been outlined in an effort to offer an 
explanation of the symptoms of the disorder and develop treatment for these symptoms 
(Dalgleish, 2004).  On the other hand, the basic mechanisms view stems from naturalistic and 
experimental research on memory, and aims to provide a broad understanding of memory in 
diverse contexts, including traumatic events (Dalgleish, 2004).  This view outlines intrusive 
memories as ‘extreme manifestations’ and seeks to explain how they come to be.  Brewin 
(2014a) suggests that the differing findings between the special and basic mechanism view 
largely rest on these different theoretical and methodological approaches.  He ultimately 
concluded that, although there may be different theoretical emphases, there is no definite 
distinction between special and basic mechanisms (Brewin, 2014a).  In other words, there is still 
much we do not know or understand about how memory behaves; and thus, Brewin suggests that 
instead of framing questions in terms of special/basic mechanisms, we should simply continue to 
explore how ordinary memory mechanisms operate under various circumstances. 
Despite their theoretical differences, there has been widespread agreement regarding 
certain concepts of PTSD symptomology.  For example, there is shared belief that PTSD is 
associated with the involuntary intrusion of vivid memories containing large quantities of 
sensory detail (Brewin, 2014a).  Another common principle among PTSD researchers and 
cognitive researchers is that intrusive memories develop as a result of the intensity and 
consequences of the event, and the incompatibility of the appraisal and the meaning of the 
information with pre-existing schematic beliefs and moral standards (Berntsen, 2010; Brewin et 
al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers, 2010; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Horowitz, 1976; 
Meichenbaum, 1996; Rauch & Foa, 2006).  The incompatibility is best explained in terms of 
cognitive dissonance, whereby there is a discrepancy between an individual’s behavior and his or 
her wish to conform to their desired self-image and values (Festinger, 1957).  This discrepancy 
has been associated with emotions of shame or guilt regarding an event, and is linked to the 
distressing and recurring nature of these memories, which in turn results in maladaptive 
cognitive strategies to abate these feelings (i.e., suppression and avoidance) (Rauch & Foa, 
2006).  The intrusive nature of the memory and the unpleasant emotions that tend to be 
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associated with the traumatic memory, often lead individuals who are suffering to try to push 
recollections of the traumatic event out of their minds.  This suppression, paradoxically, has been 
shown to enhance rather than reduce accessibility of memories (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & 
White, 1987), and increases the impact of the trauma on the individuals (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).   
Avoidance is another maladaptive cognitive strategy that is often used by individuals who are 
experiencing intrusive memories, and which also paradoxically leads to the maintenance of these 
PTSD symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 1976).  People may avoid anything that 
causes negative or positive feelings about the event, such as places, clothing, activities, friends, 
etc.  Avoiding reminders of the traumatic event often prevents the possibility of correcting the 
appraisal of the event and changing the meaning of the event in the person’s world-view,  
thereby increasing the persistent and recurrent features of these memories. 
These theories that have been put forth in the PTSD literature further highlight how 
intrusive memories are developed and maintained.  Specifically, there is agreement amongst 
researchers that intrusive memories occur, in part, as a result of the emotionality of the event, 
and the meaning of the event as interpreted by the individual.  More specifically, fear and threat 
(internal and external) are common feelings that occur at the time of the event (and continue 
after).  How the event is then perceived (distinctiveness), appraised or given meaning (morals- or 
schema-deviant), and how the individual subsequently copes with it (e.g., with or without 
avoidance/suppression) will determine the accessibility of the memories and their influence.  
Involuntary memories are often sensory in nature, and can become intrusive via recurrent and 
distressing associative cues and triggers.   
Experiencing intrusive memories can result in feelings of anger, anxiety, and shame, 
which in turn reinforce the maladaptive coping strategies mentioned above.  Therefore, 
regardless of which view is taken (special or basic mechanism), the implications for treatment 
are similar – minimize avoidance and enhance emotional processing of the event.  There are also 
a number of other factors that have been found to play a role in the development of PTSD and in 
the maintenance of intrusive symptoms.  These include individual factors (e.g., IQ, personality; 
Brewin & Soni, 2011; Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000), social factors (e.g., family and 
community function/support, stress related to losses, roles and relationships; Andrews, Brewin, 
& Rose, 2003; Bisson, 2009), biological factors (e.g., fear and recall processes in higher-order 
brain regions – amygdala, hippocampus; Shin et al., 2004), and historical factors (e.g., childhood 
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trauma or past victimization; Briere, Agee, & Dietrich, 2016).   
In summary, we know a considerable amount about intrusive memories.  That being said, 
much of these details have come from literature examining victims of crime, war veterans, first 
responders, and laypersons, and there is little known about intrusive memories in perpetrators of 
violence, such as offender populations.  This issue is explored next.  
1.4 Offenders and Intrusive Memories 
Offenders’ intrusive memories have been more generally studied in the context of PTSD.  
Prevalence rates of PTSD and associated symptoms in violent offenders are higher than rates 
found in the general population (6.8%), occurring in 11-58% of cases (with the higher rates 
found in mentally ill offenders; Beaudette, Power, & Stewart, 2015; Gray et al., 2003; Kessler et 
al., 2005; Papanastassiou et al., 2004; Pollock, 1999).  In the past few decades, researchers have 
started asking how much of offenders’ PTSD is linked to offenders’ memories of their own 
crimes, and they have found that, indeed, offenders experience PTSD symptoms related to their 
own offence(s) (Chung, Di, & Wan, 2016; Harry & Resnick, 1986; Musker, 2013; 
Papanastassiou et al., 2004; Pollock, 1999; Spitzer et al., 2001; Welfare & Hollin, 2015).  For 
example, Spitzer and colleagues (2001) investigated the frequency of traumatic events, PTSD, 
and sub-syndromal variants, in 53 forensic psychiatric patients (96% male).  Interestingly, their 
findings revealed that the patient’s own criminal offence was among the most common topics of 
intrusive memories reported by patients.  Other common topics included childhood sexual or 
physical abuse, rape, torture, witnessing something distressing, and neglect (Spitzer et al., 2001).  
More recently, Musker (2013) examined PTSD in 39 forensic psychiatric patients (82% male).  
Participants in that study identified on average eight major stressful events, with 41% relating 
their most common suffering to the offence they committed.  Pollock (1999) also studied PTSD 
in 80 male perpetrators of homicide, specifically looking at how characteristics of the offence 
itself and of the offender contribute to the development of these symptoms, and found that 52% 
of the total sample of offenders met criteria for PTSD.  Chung and colleagues (2016) similarly 
found that 44% of their sample of male perpetrators of homicide met the criteria for PTSD 
related to their offence, and 13% met criteria for partial-PTSD.  Welfare and Hollin (2015) 
examined childhood trauma and offence-related trauma in 34 young male offenders convicted of 
serious violent offences or murder, and found that 44% of offenders reported distressing 
intrusion symptoms related to their offence.  A total of 42% with serious violent offences and 
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50% with murder offences reported varying levels of traumatic symptomatology related either to 
their childhood or to their offense (distinctions were not reported between these two ‘causes’ of 
trauma).    
Evans and colleagues (2007a, 2007b) have focused specifically on the topic of offenders’ 
intrusive memories (largely focusing on young offenders), and report that there is a need for 
more studies examining offenders’ experiences of intrusive memories.  In one of their studies 
Evans et al. (2007b) found that the intrusive memories reported by male violent young offenders 
were reminiscent of those reported by victims of trauma (and consistent with the description of 
intrusive memories above).  Specifically, these offenders’ intrusive memories included: (i) a 
predominance of sensory detail such as vivid visual images, sounds, and other sensations; (ii) a 
sense of time distortion, such that the memories seemed to be happening in the present rather 
than the past; (iii) a tendency to be triggered involuntarily by specific reminders that relate in 
some way to the circumstances of the assault; and (iv) an associated high level of distress.  The 
intrusive memories reported in Evans et al. (2007b) also corresponded to parts of the event that 
these offenders described as being out of their control, threatening, or distressing (i.e., when the 
meaning of the event changed dramatically for the worse for them), and to parts of the event that 
were perceived by these offenders to be a moral breach (i.e., moral breach stood out with 
significance to them; e.g., victim was undeserving).   
Findings from these studies discussed above suggest that the crime, and the act of 
committing it, can itself be traumatizing to offenders and result in intrusive symptomology.  This 
idea is akin to the recent research examining ‘perpetrator induced trauma’ and ‘moral injuries’ in 
veterans who killed or committed violence during combat (Jordan, Eisen, Bolton, Nash, & Litz, 
2017; Litz et al., 2009; MacNair, 2015; Maguen et al., 2011; Nash et al., 2013).  This literature 
speaks to the development of PTSD symptomology from exposure to events that may be 
traumatic, but not in the theoretically traditional sense of involving threats to life and safety; but 
rather, because these actions involved violations of deeply held beliefs and values.  Therefore, 
events associated with perpetration and moral injury are not chiefly based on fear, but on other 
cognitions and emotions, such as shame (Litz et al., 2009).  Although noting the theoretical 
difference between symptoms developing as a result of victimization and threats to safety, and 
those due to committing acts of violence or crime, the emotional and cognitive models of PTSD 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986) are still useful in shedding light on the impact of 
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perpetrator induced trauma.  Specifically, these negative self-appraisals, attributions and 
dissonance about the event and an individual’s actions during the crime or violence, serve to 
create and maintain feelings like shame.  Litz and colleagues (2009) also suggests that actions 
during a violent event and the related sensory components may produce distress “comparable to 
consequences of direct life threat” (p. 696).  Avoidance behaviors and emotional numbing are 
then often (mal)adapted to deal with these ‘moral injuries’ and the meaning of the event, 
subsequently maintaining or reinforcing these feelings and related symptoms (e.g., intrusive 
thoughts and memories about the violence or crime; Litz et al., 2009).  
1.4.1 ‘Messiness’ of Trauma 
As noted earlier, prevalence rates of PTSD and associated symptoms in offender 
populations are higher than rates found in the general population – and this often encompasses 
incidents of past victimization or trauma.  For example, Ardino, Milani, and Di Blasio (2013) 
examined exposure to child abuse and neglect, as well as the presence of PTSD symptoms, in a 
sample of 75 offenders (67% male).  Findings revealed that the majority of participants 
experienced childhood abuse and neglect, and approximately 15% of their sample had a history 
of sexual assault (Ardino et al., 2013).  Wolff and Shi (2012) similarly found high rates of 
childhood and adulthood trauma in their sample of 3,986 male incarcerated offenders.  
Specifically, rates of physical, sexual, and emotional trauma ranged from 44.7% physical trauma 
in childhood to 4.5% sexual trauma in adulthood (Wolff & Shi, 2012).  For populations, such as 
veterans and offenders, it can be challenging to tease apart trauma symptoms that arise from 
witnessing or being a victim of violence, from symptoms arising from perpetrating violence.  
This speaks to the ‘messiness’ of trauma (which is also pertinent in victim populations who have 
previous victimizations).  Briere and colleagues (2016) explored this ‘messiness,’ specifically 
examining the role between exposure to different types of traumatic events and PTSD in a 
sample of community individuals and in a sample of incarcerated offenders.  These researchers 
found that a higher number (frequency count) of different types of trauma across a lifetime was 
associated with PTSD in both the general population and offender samples.  Specific findings 
speak further to a cumulative/compounding effect of trauma, whereby those participants in the 
offender sample with only one type of trauma exposure had a 17% percent likelihood of current 
PTSD, whereas those exposed to six or more other trauma types had a 64% chance of PTSD 
(Briere et al., 2016).   
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Given this significant occurrence of previous victimization, combined with trauma 
related to offending behavior(s), cumulative trauma is likely pertinent when examining offender 
populations.  Indigenous populations, who are over-represented in the Canadian correctional 
system (Public Safety Canada, 2015), have historically experienced decades of trans-generational 
trauma (re: colonization, and residential schools), which compounds this cumulative effect of 
trauma even further.  When conducting research examining intrusive memories in an offender 
population, it can be hard to piece out trauma memories/triggers related to an offence versus past 
victimization or offending, and as such, researchers must be cognisant of the ‘messiness’ of 
trauma when interpreting findings. 
Although acknowledging the ‘messiness’ described above, the literature clearly identifies 
that offence -related intrusive memories are something with which offenders “suffer.”  Their 
experiences of intrusive memories are consistent with the earlier descriptions of involuntary and 
intrusive memories.  In addition, it has been demonstrated that young offenders’ experiences are 
akin to those found in studies examining victims of trauma.  These research findings discussed 
thus far hint at the significance and relevance of certain factors in the development of offenders’ 
intrusive memories.  Specifically, it is known that deviations from moral standards or life-script 
(i.e., cognitive dissonance about the self with regards to the event) are important in the 
development of intrusive memories.  The discomfort in reconciling this dissonance is related to 
shame, and shame has in fact been highlighted in the victim literature as a relevant factor in 
PTSD (e.g., Andrews, Brewin, Rose, & Kirk, 2000; Budden, 2009).  This connection has also 
been found in veterans of war who committed violence during combat (e.g., “moral injury” 
linked to PTSD; Litz et al., 2009). However, the role of shame in the development of intrusive 
memories in offenders, is unknown, as it has not yet been directly explored in this population.  
The development of intrusive memories is also recognized to be related to the distinctiveness and 
emotionality of the event, and there has been speculation in the literature about how this relates 
to the type of crime (reactive/instrumental) committed by the offender (e.g., Pollock, 1999).  
That being said, little is actually known about the connection between the type of crime and 
trauma symptomology, as well as how this connection relates to shame.  Lastly, although it is 
understood that the development of intrusive memories has to do with the way the event relates 
to the self, in terms of life-scripts and appraisals of self, it is not yet known how the offender’s 
perception of self relates to the recall perspective taken in recalling the offence.  Specifically, it 
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is unclear if the role of self-appraisals and the experience of intrusive memories relate to whether 
offenders would be more likely to see themselves in the memory of the event, or if they would be 
removed from it and view the offence from the perspective of an outsider.  
In summary, three important factors, shame, the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, 
and recall perspective, have yet to be examined in terms of their relationship with offenders’ 
intrusive memories.  These findings above highlight that the topic of offenders’ intrusive 
memories is a relevant and worthy area for exploration to further our understanding of it and its 
consequences.  Specifically, it is valuable to enhance our knowledge about intrusive memories in 
adult offenders by exploring these three factors.  A better understanding of factors involved in 
offenders’ intrusive memories may result in an improved ability to identify intrusive memories 
and to target them in treatment, with larger implications related to reducing offender violence in 
institutions and in the community.   
1.5 Factors that May Influence Offenders’ Intrusive Memories 
The section below outlines the literature on two individual differences factors, shame and 
instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, that might influence offender intrusive memories. These 
nuances are explored next, whereas the subsequent section will explore the relationship between 
recall perspective and intrusive memories.  
1.5.1 Shame 
The concept of shame has been around for centuries, and the roots of the word are 
thought to derive from an Old English word meaning “to cover” (Lewis, 1971).  In the nineteenth 
century, Darwin (1872/1965) discussed shame in terms of embarrassment, relating it to how 
others see us (i.e., external appearances).  A long standing, and widely accepted, definition 
describes shame as an involuntary state of disappointment, and a feeling of deficiency of self, or 
defeat, in response to a perceived moral transgression (Lewis, 1971).  As such, it is a painful 
emotion that often leads to a desire to escape or hide (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1995).  The 
experience of shame requires consciousness and the cognitive capacity of objective self-
awareness – specifically, shame is an evaluative emotion whereby the “source of the shame is 
our thoughts about ourselves” (Lewis, 2003, p. 1186).  Lewis (2003) suggests that shame is a 
feeling driven by attributions of self in the context of specific standards (e.g. rules, goals, 
morals).  Some standards are more valuable, or are given more weight, than others – and it is the 
violation of those standards that are more central to the definition of self that will most likely 
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lead to feelings of shame.  Taken together, people experiencing shame tend to evaluate the 
violation or transgression as being indicative of a self that is fundamentally flawed, and 
internalize this feeling (Dearing & Tangney, 2011).  
The terms guilt and shame are often used interchangeably or in similar contexts; however 
they are in fact distinct (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996).  Guilt involves 
how one feels about what one did (i.e., concerns a specific action), whereas shame concerns 
one’s entire self, and is consequently related to feelings of worthlessness and powerlessness 
(Lewis, 1971; Lewis, 2003).  The terminology of guilt and shame is further distinguished by the 
negatively valenced self-evaluation associated with shame (Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Stuewig, 
& Mashek, 2007).  Given its primary concern with one’s self and core identity, shame has been 
found to be more pathogenic, negative, and destructive than guilt (e.g., Robinaugh & McNally, 
2010).  Guilt on the other hand, is generally less painful and devastating because it does not 
directly affect one's core self-concept (Tangney et al., 1996).  Experiencing shame also has been 
linked to blame (i.e., internalizing the disapproving judgment of others), feelings of anger and 
aggression, lacking empathy (due to preoccupation on self), and the withdrawal from others 
(Parker & Thomas, 2009; Tangney et al., 1996).  In contrast, guilt involves internal evaluation 
within one’s own sense of self, feelings of empathy and regret, taking responsibility for 
actions/consequences, and taking corrective actions (Parker & Thomas, 2009).   
Shame has been linked to anger.  Specifically, shame has been identified as part of an 
affective constellation of anger-sadness-shame (Lewis, 1971; Piers & Singer, 1953; Teyber & 
McClure, 2011), whereby anger may be the most predominant state. This anger is a secondary 
feeling in response to sadness, which in itself is a secondary response to the original experience 
of shame.  In other words, shame is often a vulnerable underlying state, that, when avoided, is 
instead expressed through sadness and anger.  As such, intrapersonal and interpersonal 
difficulties can develop as a result of shame (Dearing & Tangney, 2011), and this becomes of 
particular interest when considering institutional violence and recidivism in offenders (Hosser et 
al., 2008; Martin et al., 2014).  Tangney and colleagues (1996) suggest that “clinicians might 
well consider cognitive interventions that aim to transform maladaptive shame reactions into 
more functional guilt reactions” (p. 1267).  Although working towards reducing shame to guilt 
may seem unorthodox, the importance of identifying and thus targeting shame in general is 
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imperative (Parker & Thomas, 2009). The relevance of shame in the context of offenders’ 
intrusive memories is examined below.  
1.5.1.1 Shame and offenders’ intrusive memories.  Drawing on all the literature 
discussed above, it may be that when the offender’s actions/crime do not fit with his or her 
schematic sense of self, that will result in feelings of shame, and will be distressing to him.  In 
turn, he or she will attempt to suppress these memories to avoid such feelings, causing these 
memories to become recurrent and intrusive.  Relating this process to the cognitive dissonance 
literature, the conflicting beliefs or behaviors related to committing a crime likely produce a 
feeling of discomfort (e.g., shame).  This discomfort leads to an adjustment in beliefs or 
behaviors, such as avoidance, to reduce the discomfort and restore balance (Festinger, 1957).  If 
an individual fails to minimize cognitive dissonance through reappraisal, shame can become 
increasingly pathogenic and may be related to maintained intrusive symptoms.  On the other 
hand, having just world beliefs (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978) may serve as a protective 
factor to offenders’ appraisals and feelings of shame (i.e., experience less shame).  For example, 
these individuals may be more likely to feel happy that they got caught, that their sentence is 
justified, report better well-being, and may be less likely to cause institutional disciplinary 
problems (Dalbert & Filke, 2007).  Although it is thought that many offenders may be bothered 
by their crime, some offenders may instead have pride for their action in a crime and experience 
no shame for it. This absence of shame may be tied to a preferred antisocial moral code and 
values, which will be explored later in the context of psychopathy.  
 There is limited research exploring these suppositions proposed above, and only a few 
studies have suggested that feelings of shame may be involved in offenders’ experiences of 
intrusive memories.  For example, Gray and colleagues (2003) examined the frequency of 
offence-related PTSD symptoms in a sample of mentally ill offenders.  They found that 
offenders who believed that their victims did not deserve the assault scored higher on measures 
of intrusive memories and avoidance.  In addition, results showed that the frequency of PTSD 
symptoms was greater in offenders who felt regret for their actions.  Regret is in the same family 
of emotions as shame and guilt; however, regret is distinct in that it is largely a grieving reaction 
about wanting another chance to do something differently (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994).  In 
addition, the destructive condemning judgements about the self that are central to shame are not 
part of regret (Roseman et al., 1994).  Although Gray and colleagues (2003) did not examine 
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shame directly, they proposed that shame may have played a role in offenders’ reports of 
intrusive memories and feelings of undeserved assault and regret, and they suggested that 
measures of shame should be included in future research.  Similarly, Crisford, Dare, and 
Evangeli (2008) examined guilt cognitions and trauma symptomatology related to perpetrating a 
violent offence in a sample of mentally disordered offenders.  They found that higher levels of 
offence-related trauma symptomatology were associated with higher levels of offence-related 
guilt cognitions.  Although shame was not assessed in their research, Crisford and colleagues 
suggest that shame may be associated with the variance in PTSD symptomatology over and 
above what was accounted for by guilt in their study.  Given that shame is often closely linked 
with both guilt and trauma, Crisford and colleagues suggest that future research should measure 
both shame and guilt.  Evans and colleagues (2007a) investigated which factors determine 
whether perpetrators of violent crime develop intrusive memories of their offense.  Of the 105 
young offenders who were convicted of killing or seriously harming others, 46% reported 
distressing intrusive memories.  Intrusions were associated with lower antisocial beliefs before 
the assault, greater helplessness, fear, dissociation, data-driven processing and lack of self-
referent processing during the assault, more disorganized assault recalls, a greater negative view 
of the self, negative interpretations of intrusive memories, perceived permanent change, and self-
blame (Evans et al., 2007a).  A number of these factors are consistent with the earlier description 
of intrusive memories, relating specifically to cognitive dissonance, violating moral standards, 
script/schema-deviant events, sensory thoughts, and negative appraisals.  Here again, it seems 
that shame is a crucial emotional response to these violations/deviations, and as such may be an 
important underlying factor of intrusive memories.  This connection has been made, and is 
widely accepted, in the general PTSD literature (Andrews et al., 2000; Budden, 2009; Robinaugh 
& McNally, 2010); however, it only has been alluded to, or made reference to, in prior offender 
PTSD research (Crisford et al., 2008; Evans et al., 2007a; Gray et al., 2003).   
Given that shame has not garnered much direct attention (in terms of being directly 
studied or measured) in offender research on PTSD or intrusive memories, the aim of the present 
study was to address this gap in the literature by examining the connection between shame and 
intrusive memories in offenders in the context of their crimes.  A better understanding of shame 
in the context of offenders’ intrusive memories could provide insight regarding offender well-
being, as well as treatment readiness and rehabilitation.  An offender’s emotional response to his 
24 
 
crime, and his related experience of intrusive memories, is likely linked to the distinctiveness and 
emotionality of the act itself.  This speaks to the type of crime that occurred, and this is discussed 
next.  
1.5.2 Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence 
Researchers have long been differentiating between two types of violence – an 
emotional/impulsive type, and a more “cold-blooded” premeditated type (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989; 
Feshbach, 1964).  Drawing on this earlier work, Cornell et al. (1996) coined the now popularized 
distinction of reactive vs. instrumental violence.  According to these authors, instrumental crime 
is more goal-directed (e.g., for money, possessions, and/or sexual gratification) and 
planned/prepared, or opportunistic.  Instrumental crime is typically externally motivated by these 
goals, and tends to lack both provocation by the victim and self-reported anger (internal 
motivation) at the time of the offence.  In addition, instrumental crime tends to involve a victim 
who is unknown to the offender.  This type of crime has been previously found to be typical of 
offenders who are high in psychopathy (Cornell et al., 1996; Pollock, 1999); however, this claim 
has more recently been refuted (Blais, Solodukhin, & Forth, 2014).  The idea that offenders high 
in psychopathy may be more willing to engage in criminal behavior for instrumental purposes is 
related to the idea that they seldom commit violent crimes under the influence of intense 
emotional arousal (Williamson, Hare, & Wong, 1987).   In contrast, reactive crime is internally 
motivated, and is characterized by emotional arousal and a sense of impulsivity (absence of 
planning or premeditated goal).  Reactive crime often involves evidence of victim provocation 
(real or perceived), and the offence is consequently an expression of anger resulting from the 
provocation.  Although the reactive-instrumental distinction has been made and is widely 
accepted, some crimes may include both reactive and instrumental components (Cooper & 
Yuille, 2007; Cornell et al., 1996).  For example, a planned robbery may involve a reactive 
assault depending on how the victim reacted to the event.  Reactive crime evidently holds an 
emotional component that is distinctive to the individual.  Given the relationship between 
emotionality, event distinctiveness, and the development of intrusive memories, it is of interest to 
explore how the type of crime committed relates to offenders’ intrusive memories. 
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1.5.2.1 Instrumentality-reactivity of the offence and offenders’ intrusive memories. 
Cooper and Yuille (2007) studied affect and memories for violence, specifically examining the 
quality of memories (in terms of vividness, details, coherence, etc.) for both reactive and 
instrumental acts of violence.  They found that instrumental violence was better recalled than 
reactive violence, and they suggest that this finding is due to the “egosyntonic” nature of the 
former (i.e., positive valence experienced at the time of the event, and actions that are consistent 
with the offender’s world view).  Memories for reactive violence, on the other hand, are 
“egodystonic” (i.e., experienced with negative valence, and actions that are inconsistent with the 
offender’s world view).  These results regarding the lower quality of negatively valenced and 
script-deviant memories are somewhat contradictory to the memory literature discussed above.  
These authors, however, do not make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary memories.  
Their study examined offender accounts from voluntary memories; had they examined 
involuntary/ intrusive memories, they may have found that reactive violence is recalled just as 
well as instrumental violence.  Specifically, the egodystonic nature of reactive violence is 
consistent with the factors previously described, which increase the likelihood that an event is 
remembered involuntarily and intrusively (e.g., schema-deviant, breach of moral standards and 
life script, and emotionality).   
 This idea that reactive violence would be remembered involuntarily and intrusively is 
illustrated in some of the offender PTSD literature.  For example, Pollock (1999) found that 
reactive violence was associated with 95% of the PTSD identified in his offender sample.  Gray 
and colleagues (2003) further suggested that planned vs. impulsive crimes may be relevant to the 
development of offence-related trauma symptoms, but this hypothesis was outside the scope of 
their research and was not examined.  A case study by Kruppa (1991) described the 
psychological assessment and treatment of a sex offender who experienced intrusive memories 
of a homicide he had committed.  She suggests that the behavioral loss of control reported by the 
offender led him to be vulnerable to developing intrusive memories.  These examples highlight 
that the impulsive and emotional components of reactive violence may make the crime more 
likely to be experienced as traumatic.  Specifically, the behavioural loss of control reported by 
offenders during a reactive crime parallels a schema-deviant context that conflicts with moral 
standards, which may lead the offenders to be vulnerable to the development of intrusive 
memories (Pollock, 1999).  
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 The schema-deviant element to reactive violence, and associated experience of intrusive 
memories, may be related to shame.  Although the connection between shame, schema-deviant 
events, and intrusive memories has been recognized in the literature, there is little research 
examining how the type of crime influences this connection in offenders.  Pollock (1999) 
provides some interesting support for the idea that the relationship between the instrumentality-
reactivity of the offence and shame plays a role in the development of intrusive memories.  
Specifically, his results indicated that offenders identified as “psychopaths” were more likely to 
commit instrumental violence, and were also the least traumatized by their offence.  Given that 
psychopaths are known to possess characteristics contrary to shame, such as glibness, lack of 
remorse, and lack of empathy, this finding creates an intriguing connection, whereby 
psychopathy may serve as a protective factor against intrusive memories (Pollock, 1999).  The 
act of instrumental violence and the lack of shame in offenders high in psychopathy also has 
been found in a larger body of literature (e.g., Cornell et al., 1996; Porter & Woodworth, 2007; 
Williamson et al., 1987), and the idea that psychopathic offenders are relatedly less likely to be 
traumatized by their offence provides a glimpse into the potential relationship between shame 
and the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence.   
Although reactive violence has been related to experiencing trauma related/intrusive 
memories, no study to-date has explored the link between shame and reactive violence in the 
development of intrusive memories.  An aim of the current study was to gain a better 
understanding of this relationship to inform treatment and management of offenders (e.g., 
treatment planning, risk assessments for custody and release or probation decisions) based on the 
types of violence committed.  As noted earlier, the offenders’ perceptions about the schema-
deviant element of the event is related to the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, and their 
pursuant experience of intrusive memories is likely linked to the overall emotional response to 
the event.  This theory speaks to the offenders’ life-script and how they perceive themselves in 
the event, which is discussed next in the context of recall perspective. 
1.6 Recall Perspective and Emotionality of Event 
Events may be remembered from two points of view (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  One is 
from a first-person or field perspective, whereby people recall an event as if relived through their 
own eyes looking outward (i.e., they do not see themselves in the memory, they are just recalling 
the memory as they experienced it).  The other perspective involves recalling an 
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autobiographical event from a third-person or observer perspective, whereby people look at the 
situation from an external vantage point (like a bystander) and see themselves “from the outside” 
as actors in the memory (Nigro & Neisser, 1983, p. 1).  It has been demonstrated that when a 
person is trying to remember feelings, he or she is more likely to take a field perspective than a 
person who is trying to recall more concrete and objective situations (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  
That being said, Nigro and Neisser suggest that events involving high degrees of emotional self-
awareness (e.g., giving a public presentation, or running from a threatening situation) may be 
experienced and recalled from an observer perspective.  Other research has found that people 
tend to use the observer perspective when visualizing thoughts of actions or events that conflict 
with their current self-concept (e.g., Libby & Eibach, 2002).  In this latter context, it appears that 
the observer perspective operates as a distancing mechanism, whereby the person perceives his 
or her conflicting past self as different from his or her current self (Wilson & Ross, 2003).  This 
view is akin to early interpretations made by Freud (1899/1950), whereby he suggested that 
people mask deep emotional conflicts by taking an observer perspective when recalling a 
memory.  
1.6.1 Intrusive Memories and Recall Perspective 
The idea of the observer perspective serving as a distancing mechanism, particularly 
when there is a conflict with the self-concept, is relevant when considering the significance of 
schema-deviance and emotionality in the development of intrusive memories.  This relevance 
has been evidenced in research examining trauma memories, whereby participants are more 
likely to use the observer perspective when recalling traumatic events, particularly in the context 
of intrusive memories (e.g., Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003; Porter & Birt, 2001).  Berntsen 
and colleagues (2003) suggest that the traumatized person develops a need to distance him- or 
herself from the painful experience of reliving the event, and therefore is motivated to use an 
observer perspective in remembering.  Although distancing via the observer perspective has been 
found to help keep emotions at bay, it also serves as emotional avoidance. In the context of 
PTSD, avoidance can paradoxically enhance the impact of the intrusive memories (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000).  According to these findings, taking the observer perspective when recalling a 
traumatic event is associated with a poorer prognosis.  Perhaps adopting a field perspective 
instead would allow individuals to process emotions associated with the event rather than avoid 
them (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  
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The relationship between recall perspective and the combination of emotional self-
awareness during the event, and the deviant nature of the event in terms of self-concept and life-
script, appears to be relevant to the experience of intrusive memories.  Emotions such as shame 
can lead individuals to cope via suppression or avoidance attempts, and shame itself also has a 
role in the recall perspective taken.  Robinaugh and McNally (2010) examined the role of shame 
on recall perspective and the influence of these factors on emotional intensity of the event and 
PTSD symptoms in a sample consisting of primarily student participants.  Contrary to the 
connection noted above between avoidance and observer perspective in recall of intrusive 
memories, Robinaugh and McNally (2010) found that PTSD symptoms were associated with 
high emotional intensity recalled from the field perspective, and that this association was 
attributable to the heightened centrality of the memory to self-identity and autobiographical 
recall.  Robinaugh and McNally (2010) suggest that the perspective taken at recall is indicative 
of the congruence between these participants’ identity and their memory for the shame 
provoking event.  Specifically, participants recalling shame from the observer perspective rated 
the memory as having less personal coherence, and reported lower psychopathology.  Although 
there are mixed findings regarding emotionality, the role of avoidance, and which perspective is 
more likely to be taken, there is agreement in the literature in terms of the significant role of how 
the self is viewed (in terms of life-script, schema-deviance, and self-concept) and the 
development on intrusive memories.  An aim of the current study was to further explore the 
direction of the association between recall perspective and intrusive memories.  The direction of 
this association was supplemented by also exploring the effects of the instrumentality-reactivity 
of the offence (in terms of its congruency with life-script), and shame (in terms of its congruency 
with self-concept) on the perspective taken.  This is an area of research that needs further study, 







CHAPTER 2: The Current Study 
2.1 Rationale 
Offenders’ memories about their crimes, in general, tend to only be of interest for risk 
assessment, trial, or accountability purposes (i.e., admitting commission of the offence, and/or 
claims of amnesia about the offence).  Beyond this use, offenders are infrequently asked about 
memories of their crimes.  The topic of offenders’ intrusive memories about their crimes is fairly 
new.  Most of the past research in the area of offender PTSD or intrusive memories has been 
conducted in forensic psychiatric samples, young offender samples, and/or has focused 
specifically on violent offences (see Table A.1 in Appendix A).  This past research, along with 
the trauma literature on student, victim, tsunami survivor, veteran, and first responder 
populations, has contributed to our understanding of intrusive memories.  Factors such as shame, 
the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, and recall perspective may be relevant to how 
offenders experience intrusive memories; however, there is still much we do not know in terms 
of how these variables relate to each other in this population.  The goal of the current study was 
to examine these factors in relation to intrusive memories in a correctional sample of male 
offenders and across different types of offences.  Through the research questions below, the aim 
of the current study was to gain a better understanding of offenders’ intrusive memories about 
their crimes.  Although it has been identified in past research that some offenders experience 
trauma symptomology with regards to their crime(s), these related memories are not typically 
discussed or addressed in correctional settings.  Enhancing knowledge about intrusive memories, 
and improving the ability to identify them in offenders, may serve to inform clinical and 
correctional practices, as well as offender treatment readiness, within institutions across the 
country.  
2.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Eleven specific research questions were addressed in this study.  Each of these questions 
are listed in turn below and are organized according to their particular topic of interest.  
Specifically, the first research question pertains to describing offenders’ intrusive memories; the 
second set of research questions explores the factors (predictors: shame, guilt, instrumentality-
reactivity of the offence) that influence intrusive memories (criterion); the third set comprises 
secondary questions of interest regarding the relationship between these different factors and 
possible secondary relationships to these (e.g., psychopathy, institutional violence); and the last 
30 
 
set of research questions explores the recall perspective taken for emotional events.  These 
research questions are followed by their accompanying hypotheses. 
2.2.1 Description of Offenders’ Intrusive Memories 
1. Question: What is the prevalence of intrusive memories reported in this sample of adult male 
offenders?  If they report intrusive memories, then what will they report in terms of triggers, 
sensory components, and distress? It was expected that: 
a. Approximately 35 to 50% of the sample would report intrusive memories, specifically 
reporting distressing, recurrent, and involuntarily triggered memories about their 
crime (Evans et al., 2007b; Gray et al., 2003; Musker, 2013; Pollock, 1999; Spitzer et 
al., 2001; Welfare & Hollin, 2015).    
b. Intrusive memories would involve a sensory component and would be triggered by 
cues related to the crime (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Evans et al., 2007b).  
c. Intrusive memories would have an impact on those individuals experiencing them.  
Specifically, these memories would be related to a high level of stress and to 
avoidance symptoms.  Individuals with intrusive memories would also likely feel like 
the event is a central part of their life story, and feel like they are reliving it (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010). 
2.2.2 Factors that may Influence Offenders’ Intrusive Memories 
2. Question: How do feelings of shame and guilt regarding the offence relate to offenders’ 
intrusive memories? It was hypothesized that: 
a. Feelings of shame and guilt would be positively correlated with one another and with 
intrusive memories (greater reports of shame and guilt would be related to more 
frequent reports of intrusive memories) (Gray et al., 2003; Robinaugh & McNally, 
2010).   
b. There would be no association between guilt and intrusive memories after controlling 
for the effects of shame (Crisford et al., 2008; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010). 
3. Question: How does the kind of crime committed relate to offenders’ intrusive memories? It 
was hypothesized that: 
a. Intrusive memories would be reported across all offence types (Gray et al., 2003). 
b. Offences that were more reactive in nature would be positively correlated with reports 
of intrusive memories (Gray et al., 2003; Kruppa, 1991; Pollock, 1999). 
31 
 
c. The more reactive the offence, the more shame would be experienced, and that both 
of these factors would lead to the development of intrusive memories, whereby shame 
would mediate the relationship between the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence 
and intrusive memories.  
4. Question: What role do emotions and avoidance play in intrusive memories? It was 
anticipated that: 
a. Higher ratings of emotions at the time of the offence would be related to more serious 
avoidance symptoms.  Similarly, the higher the rating of stress regarding the event, 
the more avoidance reported (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 1976).  
b. The reported stress rating of the event would be positively related to intrusive 
memories, and this relationship would be mediated by avoidance response/coping 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986).   
5. Question: Which factors emerge as the most significant predictors of intrusive memories? It 
was anticipated that: 
a. Given the hypothesized roles of shame, guilt, and reactive violence, shame would 
emerge as a significant predictor of intrusive memories over and above the other 
factors.  
6. Question: How accurately can we predict the occurrence of intrusive memories using the 
variables of interest in this study?  
a. Post-hoc investigations would further examine the relationship between all relevant 
primary and secondary variables explored, specifically assessing their accuracy in 
predicting intrusive memories in this adult offender population.  
2.2.3 Secondary Questions of Interest 
7. Question: What role do intrusive memories and related factors have in the occurrence of 
institutional violence? It was hypothesized that: 
a. Offenders experiencing intrusive memories would be more likely to display 
irritability and anger in the form of institutional violence (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Ehlers & Steil, 1995). 
b. Offenders reporting higher levels of shame would have higher rates of institutional 
violence (Hosser et al., 2008). 
8. Question: Is self-reported psychopathy related to institutional violence? It was expected that: 
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a. Given the facets of psychopathy and their relationship with violence and recidivism, 
higher levels of psychopathy would be positively related to counts of institutional 
violence (Hare & Neumann, 2009). 
9. Question: What role does psychopathy play in intrusive memories and related factors? It was 
hypothesized that: 
a. Higher psychopathy scores would be related to lower levels of shame and guilt 
(Cornell et al., 1996; Williamson et al., 1987). 
b. Higher psychopathy scores would be related to offences that are more instrumental in 
nature (Cornell et al., 1996; Pollock, 1999; Williamson et al., 1987). 
c. Given the anticipated relationships between psychopathy, the instrumentality-
reactivity of the offence, and guilt/shame, psychopathy may potentially serve as a 
protective factor for intrusive memories, whereby higher scores on the psychopathy 
measure would be inversely related to intrusive memories. 
2.2.4 Recall Perspective Taken for Emotional Events  
10. Question: What role do emotions and avoidance play in recall perspective? 
a. There are mixed findings regarding emotionality, the role of avoidance, and which 
recall perspective is more likely to be taken when remembering an event (Berntsen et 
al., 2003; Porter & Birt, 2001; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010).  As such, the 
relationship between these variables was explored, but specific hypotheses about 
these relationships were not made. 
11. What perspective is taken when recalling intrusive memories? 
a. Offenders may take the observer perspective when describing the crime as a form of 
cognitive avoidance to distance themselves from the difficult experience (Berntsen et 
al., 2003; Porter & Birt, 2001).  That being said, perhaps the failure to adopt an 
observer perspective is what makes memories increasingly distressing, whereby 
higher distress and shame would be expressed in the field perspective (Robinaugh & 
McNally, 2010).  Due to the mixed findings in the literature, the specific direction of 
the relationship between intrusive memories and recall perspective was not 
hypothesized.   
b. The directionality of the relationship between recall type and intrusive memories may 
depend on the offender’s coping mechanisms (whether attempts at avoidance are 
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made).  Given the theoretical relevance of emotion in the relationship between recall 
perspective and intrusive memories, it was also anticipated that this relationship may 
be mediated/moderated by the emotions during and after the offence. 
2.3 Method 
In this section, methodological considerations and the overall procedure are outlined.  
Specific demographic characteristics of the sample, as well as feedback solicited from participants, 
are provided. 
2.3.1 Participants 
The study sample consisted of 105 male2 offenders who were provincially sentenced (i.e., 
up to a maximum of two-years less a day), and who were serving their time at the Saskatoon 
Provincial Correctional Center, the Urban Camp Program, or the Community Training 
Residence, in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.  Two offenders chose to discontinue their participation 
while we were going over the instructions to identify which crime to focus on, in that they both 
decided they did not want to disclose the crime (one had not been convicted of it yet, and the 
other reported shame and difficulty discussing it).  A third offender chose to discontinue, stating 
that he was bored and the questions made him feel like he was back in school.  The researcher 
terminated collection with two other participants – one was low functioning who did not seem to 
understand the purpose of the study or the questions, and the other who was quite tangential and 
could not stay on task to provide an answer to the questions after repeated efforts to redirect him.  
With the exclusion of these five individuals, the final sample consisted of 100 participants.  
See Table 2.1 for a summary of demographic information for the total sample, and for 
those who endorsed experiencing intrusive memories.  Overall, participants in the final sample 
ranged in age from 18 to 61 years, their racial background was mixed, they focused on diverse 
offence charges, had overall low levels of education, and some offenders reported being involved 
in incidents of violence (ranging from 1 to 17 incidents).  A number of participants reported 
having received a mental health diagnosis (e.g., Bipolar, ADHD, Depression, Anxiety, Substance 
Use Disorder, and PTSD). 
  
                                                 
2 Housed in a male correctional centre – but two of these ‘males’ were transgender 
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Table 2.1   
Sample Demographics for the Total Sample & for Participants with Intrusive Memories 
 Total  
(N = 100) 
Participants with 
Intrusive Memories 
(N = 43) 
Age M = 34.17 (SD = 10.47) 
Range: 18-61 
M = 35.93 (SD = 11.21) 
Range: 18-59 
 n % n % 
Racial background      
Indigenous (Métis, First Nations, 
Inuit) 
58 58% 19 44% 
Caucasian 39 39% 22 51% 
Other 3 3% 2 5% 
Education     
Less than High School  47 47% 17 39% 
Completed High School (or 
equivalent) 
29 29% 14 33% 
Attended some university or college 16 16% 9 21% 
Completed university or college 
degree 
8 8% 3 7% 
Mental Health Diagnosis 26 26% 15 35% 
Offence Discussed     
Property Offences 29 29% 11 26% 
Motor Vehicle Offences 21 21% 9 21% 
Offences of Violence 27 27% 13 30% 
Sexual Offences 7 7% 4 9% 
Drug Offences 6 6% 3 7% 
Weapons Offences 5 5% 1 2% 
Administration of Justice Offences 2 2% 1 2% 
Homicide 3 3% 1 2% 
Institutional Violence 27 27% 12 29% 
Age of Memory     
Within last 2 years 63 63% 32 72% 
3–10 years ago 20 20% 6 14% 
11–27 years ago 15 15% 4 9% 
Drugs or Alcohol During Offence 25 25% 14 33% 
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2.3.2 Materials  
A questionnaire packaged compiled of various measures (totalling 213 items), described 
below, was used to gather information regarding the variables of interest (see Appendices F-O).  
The package provided to participants also included consent and debriefing forms (see 
Appendices C and D).    
2.3.2.1 Impact of Event Scale (IES).  This 15-item questionnaire was developed by 
Horowitz, Wilner, and Alvarez (1979) to measure subjective distress related to a specific event.  
All items of the IES were anchored to a specific stressor (e.g., the offence), and participants were 
asked to rate items on a 4-point scale according to how often each has occurred since the offence 
in question happened (0 = not at all, 1 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, and 5 = often; see Appendix F).   
The IES is comprised of two subscales.  The first subscale examines the extent to which 
memories intrude, and includes seven items that measure intrusive symptoms (intrusive thoughts, 
nightmares, feelings, and imagery).  For the purpose of the current study, the intrusion subscale 
was used as a continuous measure of intrusive memories, with higher scores indicating a higher 
frequency/severity of intrusive symptoms.  The other subscale examines the extent to which the 
individual tries to exclude the memories from consciousness, and includes eight items that 
measure avoidance symptoms (numbing of responsiveness, avoidance of feelings, situations, and 
ideas).  This two-factor structure has been found to be stable over different types of events and 
can discriminate between stress reactions at different times after the event (Sundin & Horowitz, 
2002). Both subscales have demonstrated good internal consistency (intrusions α = .86, 
avoidance α = .82), and are moderately (.63) correlated (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002). In Horowitz 
and colleagues’ (1979) study, the mean intrusion subscale score for their stress clinic patient 
sample was 21.0 for both men and women, while the mean for their medical student sample was 
2.5 for males and 6.1 for female students. Stress clinic patient means on the avoidance subscale 
were 35.3 for male patients and 42.1 for female patients, while medical student means were 6.9 
for male students and 12.7 for female students. 
The two subscales combined provide a total subjective stress score, with higher scores 
indicating a greater impact of the event.  The IES provides a continuous measure of frequency of 
intrusions and avoidance that allows for these symptoms to be identified even in sub-clinical 
populations.  It has been suggested that the total scores can be interpreted as follows: A score of 
27 or more suggests that there is a 75% chance of PTSD (Coffey & Berglind, 2006).  Those with 
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scores in this range who do not have full PTSD may have partial PTSD or at least some of the 
symptoms.  A score of 35 and above has been suggested to represent a cut-off for a probable 
diagnosis of PTSD (Neal et al., 1994).  Briere and Elliott (1998) collected normative data on the 
IES from a large sample of individuals from the general population.  Individuals with a history of 
trauma had mean IES total scores of 16.7, 7.0 and 8.5 for the intrusion and avoidance subscales, 
respectively.  The IES has been used with most trauma populations, and it is one of the most 
widely used instruments to measure trauma symptoms (e.g., Foa & Rothbaum, 1998).  There is 
also evidence for the IES’s convergent validity with observer-diagnosed PTSD.             
2.3.2.2 Autobiographical Memories Questionnaire (AMQ).  This 15-item 
questionnaire assesses a variety of memory characteristics, including sensory details, emotional 
intensity, coherence with personal life-story, and involuntary nature (with scale values varying 
per item; Rubin, Boals, &  Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; see Appendix 
G).   The criteria in this questionnaire have demonstrated high reliability (α = .84 to .96) (Rubin 
et al., 2003). The areas assessed by the AMQ have been found to be affected by severity levels of 
PTSD symptomology, such questions have been used extensively in studies of autobiographical 
memory – e.g., studies with healthy control participants, memories in combat veterans diagnosed 
with PTSD, and for stressful memories of participants who varied in the severity of their PTSD 
symptom (Rubin et al. 2008).  As suggested by Rubin and colleagues, the scales should be 
considered individually rather than being summed because they measure different aspects of 
autobiographical memory.  
For the purpose of this study, the AMQ was used as a description of the memory 
characteristics and as a dichotomous measure of intrusive memories (alongside the intrusion 
subscale of the IES described above).  Specifically, intrusive memories were measured based on 
the presence/absence of their defining criteria (i.e., distressing, recurrent, and involuntarily 
triggered).  If all three criteria were met, then responses were coded as ‘yes’ for presence of 
intrusive memories. 
2.3.2.3 Emotional Experiences Questionnaire (EEQ).  Porter and Birt (2001) initially 
designed the EEQ to collect information regarding subjective and objective memory reports of 
emotional events.  For the purpose of this study, five questions selected from the EEQ assessing 




Items assess stress ratings of the offence (1 = not at all stressful to 7 = extremely 
traumatic), and whether participants’ memory of it contained sensory components (visual, 
sounds, smell, touch, and taste), where each memory is coded from 1 to 5 based on the number 
of sensory components.  These items served as descriptors of the offence and memory.  Lastly, 
the offender’s vantage point (recall perspective) was assessed on a 3-point scale (1 =I can never 
see myself in the memory, 2 = the memory changes so that I can see myself in the memory image 
only some of the time, 3 = I can always see myself in the memory).  This item served as the 
categorical measure of recall perspective (field/both/observer), with ratings increasing from a 
field perspective to a more dominant observer perspective.  See Appendix H for these items.  
Porter and Birt (2001) designed the EEQ for their study examining the nature of 
traumatic memory in undergraduate university students.  The mean stress rating of the traumatic 
events reported by this sample was 6.30 (SD = 1.08).  Overall, 84% of participants provided a 
stress rating of either ‘6’ (26.8%) or the maximum ‘7’ (57.2%).  
2.3.2.4  Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI).   The PTCI is a 33-item questionnaire that 
measures trauma-related thoughts and beliefs (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; 
Appendix I).  For the purpose of this study, the PTCI was used as measures of negative 
appraisals and self-blame in order to inform our findings regarding the relationship between 
intrusive memories, shame, the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, and the recall 
perspective taken.  Items were rated on a 7-point rating scale (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally 
agree).  The PTCI is comprised of three subscales: Negative Cognitions About Self; Negative 
Cognitions About the World; and Self-Blame.  These subscales cover a wide range of potentially 
problematic appraisals and related emotions (guilt, shame, anger, sadness, fear).  The scales have 
demonstrated construct validity, excellent internal consistency (α = .86 to .97), and good test-
retest reliability (.74 to .89).  The PTCI also discriminates well between traumatized individuals 
with and without PTSD (Foa et al., 1999). 
2.3.2.1 Trauma Related Shame Inventory (TRSI).  The TRSI is a 24-item measure that 
assesses shame related to a traumatic experience (Øktedalen, Hagtvet, Hoffart, Langkaas, & 
Smucker, 2014; Appendix J).  Items were answered based on the time since the offence in 
question happened and are rated on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = not at all correct about me; 1= 




The TRSI was used to measure shame, whereby the construct of shame is operationally 
defined as “a negative evaluation of the self in the context of trauma with a painful affective 
experience, and a behavioral tendency to hide and withdraw from others to conceal one’s own 
perceived deficiencies” (Øktedalen et al., 2014, p. 604).  The TRSI has demonstrated good 
construct validity, whereby shame as measured by the TRSI is found to be significantly distinct 
from guilt.  The TRSI is comprised of two subscales (internal shame and external shame), 
however, the authors recommend a fusion of the two by summing all the items to create a total 
score representing a general component of shame.  A modified version of the TRSI was used in 
the current study, whereby the word traumatic experience was replaced with the word the 
participant used to refer to his offence (e.g., “the gong-show;” “my first assault;” “the DUI”). 
2.3.2.2 Gudjonsson Blame Attribution Inventory – Revised (GBAI-R).  The Guilt 
Attribution Subscale from the GBAI-R was used in the current study to measure offender guilt 
(Gudjonsson & Singh, 1989; Appendix K).  This 18-item subscale assesses the degree to which 
participants continue to reproach themselves for their criminal actions (e.g., “I feel very ashamed 
of the crime I committed,” “I am constantly troubled by my conscience for the crime I 
committed”) on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).  The guilt 
subscale item mean score found in Gudjonsson and Singh’s (1989) sample of convicted 
offenders was 10.1 (SD = 4.6).  
The overall GBAI-R was initially developed to assess remorse in offenders and has 
demonstrated good reliability and transcultural validity (Gudjónsson & Pétursson, 1991).  The 
GBAI-R had been used in a number of studies examining offence related guilt and blame 
attribution (e.g., Crisford et al., 2008).  
2.3.2.3 Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence Questionnaire (I-ROQ).  This 
questionnaire was created for the purpose of the current study in order to assess the degree to 
which the offence was reactive or instrumental in nature (Appendix L).  A total of 25 items were 
created for this study, and were designed based on coding criteria assessing five distinct 
behavioral domains relevant to distinguishing between these offence types (see Cornell et al., 
1996; Vitacco, Neumann, Caldwell, Leistico, & Van Rybroek, 2006; Woodworth & Porter, 
2002).   
The items assessed the degree of presence or absence of these behaviors: (1) planning or 
preparation before the aggression; (2) goal directed or opportunistic (e.g., money, sex); (3) 
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perceived provocation by the victim; (4) anger during the aggression; and (5) the relationship to 
the victim of the aggression.  In prior research (see Cornell et al., 1996; Vitacco et al., 2006; 
Woodworth & Porter, 2002), these five domains are coded based on file reviews of the offence 
history, however for the purpose of this study, they were coded based on offender’s self-report 
responses to the items in the questionnaire.   
To further complement these five domains, and their potential relevance to shame and 
intrusive memories, additional questions were included in the current study to assess the extent 
to which offenders felt certain supplementary emotions during the event (e.g., sad, frustrated, 
ashamed, afraid, happy).  All items are rated on a 5-point scale (1 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = 
agree).  A total of 11 participants reported that their crime did not involve a victim, and as such, 
chose to leave the three questions regarding victims blank.  These crimes included drug 
trafficking, dangerous driving, break and enter, breach, and possession of a firearm.  Given that 
all crimes technically have a victim (e.g., society, drug users), neutral responses were inputted to 
deal with this missing data.   
To examine the structure of the I-ROQ measure, a principal-axis factor analysis with 
promax rotation was conducted.  This analysis extracted three factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1.00 (see Table 2.2.).  As a rule of thumb (as per Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), factor 
loadings needed to be greater than .45 (20% shared variance with the factor) to be said to load on 
a factor.  The sizes of factor loadings were mainly fair (.452) to excellent (.817), with three 
borderline low loadings (.367, .375, and .414) that were kept in as to not prematurely throw them 
out.  Specifically, lower loadings were deemed acceptable as exceptions to the rule of thumb 
given that items theoretically fit with their respective factors.  The three factors were interpreted 
as Anger During Offence (angry, hatred, frustrated, insulted, betrayed, provoked by victim, 
victim aggravated, victim not a stranger, motivated by emotions in the moment; α = .85), 
Dysphoria During the Offence (helpless, sad, inferior, ashamed, embarrassed, afraid; α = .85), 
and Lack of Planned Control (offence not planned; no goal in mind; did not offend to gain 
something; offence did not go as planned; event, thoughts, and/or feelings were in my control; 
not happy, not calm; α = .79).  These factors explain 42.78% of the total variance.  Feelings of 
impulsivity did not load on any of these factors and were not included in further analyses, 
resulting in 24 remaining items.  Higher scores on these factors reflect higher anger and 
dysphoric emotions, and a lack of plan/control (reverse coded items identified in appendix). 
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Items with cross loadings (e.g., hatred, insulted, helpless, betrayed frustrated, offending to gain 
something) were dealt with such that they were designated to their respective factors based on 
the theoretical foundation of these factors outlined in prior research (see Cornell et al., 1996; 
Vitacco et al., 2006; Woodworth & Porter, 2002).  
 Given that some crimes may include both reactive and instrumental components (Cooper 
& Yuille, 2007; Cornell et al., 1996), offence type is best assessed as a continuum rather than a 
dichotomy.  Therefore, these three factor scores were also summed to provide a total continuous 
score for instrumentality-reactivity of the offence (α = .88), with higher scores reflecting more 




Table 2.2   
Factor Loadings of I-ROQ Items 











Embarrassed .817 .213 .069 
Ashamed .736 .135 .014 
Sad .732 .278 .090 
Afraid .668 .144 .102 
Helpless .642 .419 .315 
Inferior .539 .365 .019 
Insulted .412 .793 .231 
Victim aggravated me .032 .768 .372 
Angry .407 .744 .317 
Hatred .448 .688 .158 
Frustrated .622 .637 .277 
Provoked by victim -.044 .614 .434 
Betrayed .408 .569 .107 
The victim was a stranger * .017 .452 .295 
My offence was largely motivated 
by emotions in the moment 
.400 .414 .150 
Impulsive .258 .286 .245 
The offence was planned * -.055 .252 .708 
I offended to gain something * .034 .477 .680 
Offence happened as planned * .104 .245 .655 
I had a goal in mind * -.054 .293 .612 
Calm* .260 .151 .488 
Happy* .415 .321 .474 
My feelings were out of my control .183 .316 .469 
The event was out of my control .100 .076 .375 
I could not control my thoughts .254 .275 .367 
Note: * items that were reverse coded for analyses 
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2.3.2.4 Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Short Form (SRP-SF).  The SRP-SF is as a 29-
item self-report measure of adult psychopathic features (Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, 2015; 
Appendix M).  The Short-Form was derived from the longer SRP-III Scale.  Items are 
representative of, and related to, the features outlined in the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
(Hare, 2003).  The SRP scales were organically designed to assess the four facets of psychopathy 
(Hare & Neumann, 2008), specifically interpersonal manipulation; affective callousness; an 
erratic lifestyle; and overt antisociality.  In the SRP-SF, participants were asked to rate the extent 
to which they agree with various statements about themselves using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
disagree strongly to 5 = agree strongly).  The SRP had demonstrated adequate internal 
consistency across the four scales (α = 69 to .76; Mahmut, Menictas, Stevenson, & Homewood, 
2011). The SRP-SF has demonstrated promising psychometric properties, and reflects an 
underlying structure that is consistent with the broader psychopathic construct (Dotterer et al., 
2016; Gordts, Uzieblo, Neumann, Van den Bussche, & Rossi, 2017; Neumann & Pardini, 2014). 
2.3.2.5 Trauma Symptom Check-List 40 (TSC-40). The TSC-40 is a research measure 
that evaluates symptomatology in adults associated with childhood or adult traumatic 
experiences (Briere, 1996; Appendix N).  The checklist measures aspects of posttraumatic stress 
and other symptom clusters found in some traumatized individuals.  The checklist does not 
measure all 17 criteria of PTSD, and should not be used as a complete measure of that construct.  
The TSC-40 is a 40-item self-report instrument consisting of six subscales: Anxiety, Depression, 
Dissociation, Sexual Abuse Trauma Index, Sexual Problems, and Sleep Disturbance, as well as a 
total score.  Each symptom item is rated according to its frequency of occurrence over the prior 
two months, using a four-point scale (0 = never to 3 = often).  The TSC-40 is a relatively reliable 
measure (subscale alphas typically range from .66 to .77, with alphas for the full-scale averaging 
between .89 and .91).  The TSC-40 and its predecessor, the TSC-33 (Briere & Runtz, 1989), 
have predictive validity with reference to a wide variety of traumatic experiences.  The TSC-40 
also appears to predict perpetration of intimate violence (e.g., Dutton, 1995) and vicarious 
traumatization in psychotherapists (e.g., Chrestman, 1995).  The TSC-40 was used in the current 
study to account for the complexity of trauma, and to further assess participants’ overall trauma 






 A correlational study examining the relationships between offenders’ self-reported 
intrusive memories and possible predictors of these memories (i.e., shame, guilt, avoidance, 
instrumentality-reactivity of the offence) was conducted.  This correlational study also examined 
additional relationships between secondary variables, as well as the perspective taken when 
recalling an event.  
2.3.4 Procedure 
 Ethics approval to conduct the study was obtained through the University of 
Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board (REB) in December 2015.  Unsuccessful attempts were 
made to gain access to a correctional sample of Federal inmates.  Instead, permission was 
obtained from the Saskatchewan Ministry of Corrections and Policing to gain access to the 
offender population and to collect the data in the provincial institutions.  The Director of the 
Saskatoon Correctional Center, the Director of Open Custody, and the Director of Community 
Training Residency were made aware of the research, and approved recruitment in their 
facilities.  Correctional unit-managers on-site assisted in participant recruitment.  Offenders who 
self-identified as interested in the study (see Internal Posting, Appendix B) were then approached 
by the researcher to participate.  They were brought into an interview room on the unit, and were 
provided with more information about the study in order for them to determine if they were still 
interested in participating.  This consent process consisted of these offenders being briefed on the 
nature of the study, the risks, benefits, right to withdraw, confidentially and limits to 
confidentiality (see Consent Form for full details, Appendix C).  This process involved making 
them explicitly aware that their responses would have no impact upon their care/jail time and 
that the prison/clinical team would not be informed of their responses to the study materials.  
Offenders were also informed that all results would be kept confidential within the research 
team, with the proviso that if a participant was judged to be a significant current risk of harm to 
either himself or others, disclosed a child being harmed in the community, or spoke of a crime 
the authorities did not know about, then this information would be disclosed to the Deputy 
Director of Programs at the institution.  Lastly, offenders were informed that they would not be 
promised any incentive to participate, and they were assured that a refusal to participate would 
not influence the treatment they receive or have any legal consequences.   
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 Participation in the study was then initiated with the individual offenders who consented 
to participate.  Using a similar approach to Evans and colleagues (2007a, 2007b), the study 
began with instructions to ensure that the researcher and offender were on the same page 
regarding “intrusive memories” and to orient them to think about a particular offence (see 
Appendix E).  Instructions began by telling them that “People who have committed a violent 
crime can remember the event in different ways. Some people have memories of parts of the 
crime that just pop into their head when they do not want them to.  These are usually of specific 
moments from before, during or after the incident that somehow got stuck in their head and keep 
coming back. These thoughts are of part of what actually happened at the time, rather than your 
thoughts about what has happened since, such as being in prison because of the crime.”  They 
were then asked if they sometimes get such unwanted thoughts or memories of a crime they 
committed.  If yes, then they were asked if this happened to them for one particular crime or for 
more than one crime.  If only one, then they were asked to keep that in mind for the remainder of 
their participation and that it would be the focus of the rest of the questions.  If they reported this 
happening for multiple crimes, then they were directed to focus on one specific crime that stood 
out or popped up the most frequently for them.  Giving these participants the opportunity to 
identify an offence that they felt was the most relevant or distressing to them was done to 
account for the possibility that a previous offence may have been more traumatic for the offender 
than the index offence (Crisford et al., 2008).  Similarly, if they answered no about getting 
unwanted thoughts or memories, then they were just encouraged to think of a crime they 
committed that felt like the most significant or important to them in some way.  Once they had 
the crime in mind, they were asked to tell the researcher about the nature of the offence.  Next, 
they were asked what they call this event, or what we should refer to it as (in their words) for the 
remainder of the questions.  Once this event was identified, they were told to remember “[crime 
in their words],” and keep it in mind as they answered all the questions.  They were asked if they 
understood, and if they had any questions before beginning.  Any confusion or questions were 
addressed at this point, and they were also encouraged to ask questions at any time throughout 
the questionnaire package if they did not understand something. 
After going over the instructions, each offender was provided with a copy of the 
questionnaire package (order of questionnaires was randomized).  They were told that they could 
follow along while the researcher read the questions out loud and kept track of their answers. 
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This process was done to avoid anticipated difficulties with literacy (and potential 
embarrassment related to having to disclose this limitation), and to ensure the participants’ 
understanding of these questions.  For each questionnaire, the researcher continually used their 
previously identified offence name (or their words of the event), to cue them to think of it for 
each question.  Upon completion, these offenders were debriefed about the specifics of the study 
and hypothesized results (see Debriefing form, Appendix D).  They were encouraged to refer to 
their case manager and/or chaplain at the institution if participation in the study resulted in any 
psychological distress.  Participants were also given an opportunity to provide feedback about 
their participation and ask questions, and the researcher took field notes of their comments. 
2.3.4.1 Pilot.  In order to address questions from the Ministry and the REB regarding the 
length of the questionnaire and its cultural sensitivity, a pilot was conducted with the first 10 
participants. Specifically, the first 10 offenders to participate self-identified as Indigenous, and 
feedback was solicited from them regarding their thoughts on the questionnaire and its cultural 
appropriateness.  Average completion time was also noted for these first 10 participants.  Seven 
on these participants stated they did not have any feedback or comments to make regarding the 
questionnaire.  The other three offenders offered feedback.  One commented on the overall 
treatment of Indigenous men and women by the police in the community, and spoke of injustices 
regarding this perspective.  This view was received with validation and empathy.  When 
questioned regarding whether he had any thoughts regarding the specific items in the study, this 
participant stated these questions were fine and he had no concerns.  The other two participants 
expressed appreciation for being talked to and stated that they were surprised by how much they 
had been unconsciously avoiding their thoughts and memories about their offences.  Upon 
exploration of these comments, they stated that they often do not have the opportunity to talk to 
anybody besides the correctional officers, and that they valued the opportunity to reflect and tell 
their stories.  The average completion time for these 10 participants was 43 minutes (min = 34, 
max = 60).  As a result of these pilot findings, no procedural changes were made to the study and 
data collection continued as described above (and these 10 participants were included in the final 
sample).  
2.3.5 Comments on Participation 
Most people participating in research studies that ask about trauma memories find it to be 
a positive experience, and they typically do not regret participating (Jaffe, DiLillo, Hoffman, 
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Haikalis, & Dykstra, 2015).  As such, we did not expect that participation in the current study 
would cause participants any further stress or suffering beyond what they might already be going 
through.  That being said, completing questionnaires regarding a potentially traumatic 
event/offence can create some stress, and we recognized that asking offenders to answer 
questions about the offence and to reflect on their feelings, memories, and thoughts related to it, 
could be challenging for some individuals to do.   
In recognizing the sensitive nature of discussing offending behaviors and feelings, we 
wanted to give participants a chance to share their thoughts on any aspect of the study, the forms, 
and the questions.  Akin to the findings of Jaffe and colleagues (2015), some of the feedback 
solicited from participants during/after participation related to benefiting from participating in 
the study.  For example, many reported that it was “good to talk about,” “I feel better talking 
about it - don't get many opportunities to talk to anyone...helpful,” “made me look at myself,” 
and “makes you think!”  Two participants cried for the duration of completing the questionnaire 
package, and reported high levels of shame regarding their offence (i.e., domestic assault, and 
child pornography).  They were asked if they were alright, and were offered breaks periodically 
during the questions.  Both were insistent on continuing with their participation.  Afterward, the 
unit staff was made aware that these individuals were feeling emotional and they were to check 
in on their well-being later on.  Two other participants stated that they felt no shame or guilt, but 
rather that they were proud that their street credibility was enhanced by their offence. 
Other feedback provided related to the questionnaire itself.  Some participants noted that 
it would be important to also ask them about their motivations for their crimes, their 
past/childhood history, and past traumas.  For example, one said “intent matters” when he was 
asked about the level of stress associated with the event.  Another noted that we “should ask 
about impact of crime on future - consequences (e.g., “needing to pay SGI [Saskatchewan 
Government Insurance],” “no licence”)…the impact of these things.”  One participant wondered 
what his victims would say if given the same questionnaire about that offence: “you should ask 
these questions to victims to see how the crime impacts them.”   
Some participants reported that they found “Questions a little bit repetitive,” Questions 
too broad sometimes…and need to be more specific,” and “Some questions were kind of weird.”  
This latter comment related to the questions in the TSC-40 questionnaire which asked about 
sexual experiences in the last few months.  Participants found these questions somewhat 
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uncomfortable and irrelevant given that they were in jail.  Although all participants were told 
during the consent procedure that they could leave a response blank if they preferred, it was 
decided (after supervisor consultation) that an additional statement would be made when 
introducing this set of questions telling participants that some may not be relevant and reminding 
them that they could leave their response blank if they wanted.  This addition seemed to be 
sufficient in easing any participant discomfort relating to these items. 
One participant reported that he experienced strong trauma-symptoms about his offence, 
but that he was on a high dose of mood stabilizers which “numbs it all out.”  He stated that if it 
were not for the medication, he would otherwise be volatile and not be able to participate or 
engage in these questions.  He noted that he sees a psychiatrist for medication dose revisions but 
does not receive trauma therapy/treatment while in custody.  Another participant had difficulty 
answering the questionnaire items without providing some background information or related 
story.  He reported that story-telling was an important part of his Indigenous culture and that he 
thought it was an important tradition to uphold (in terms of teachings and sharing knowledge).  
In an effort to remain culturally sensitive and respectful, his story-telling was encouraged, while 
balancing this with reminding him of the purpose of the study and keeping him on track (re: 
relevance of the stories to the item).  As a result, his participation lasted over one hour and a half, 
and he seemed to appreciate being accommodated and heard.   
2.4 Data Screening and Observations 
Data screening and cleaning were conducted on all measures prior to carrying out 
analyses using SPSS 24.  All relevant assumptions (normality, adequate sample sizes, 
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity) were assessed and met prior to conducting the analyses 
discussed below.  Square root transformations were conducted on the Trauma Related Shame 
Inventory (TRSI) total scores to correct for skewness; otherwise all other assumptions of 
normality were met where necessary.  Analyses of scale reliability were conducted and revealed 
that all scales, with the exception of the Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI) self-blame 
subscale, demonstrated strong internal consistency (Cronbach α’s > .80).  The self-blame 
subscale demonstrated poor internal consistency (α =.46) and this was not significantly improved 
by deleting items.  This subscale (along with the PTCI negative cognitions subscales) was meant 
to inform our findings regarding the relationship between intrusive memories, shame, and the 
instrumental-reactivity of the offence, but given its limited reliability with this sample, no 
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analyses were conducted on the self-blame subscale.  The self-blame subscale may have done so 
poorly in this study because it was originally created for assessing blame in events that happen to 
individual (e.g., victim) as opposed to by individuals (e.g., perpetrator) – in the sense that it may 
be tapping into a different sense of blame and responsibility (or lack there of) in the current study 
that “muddied” the scale responses.  
Observations during data collection flagged some concerns regarding the construct 
validity of both the Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory and the Trauma-Symptoms Checklist 
in a jail context.  Specifically, both of these measures were developed on samples of trauma 
victims in the community (Briere & Runtz, 1989; Foa et al., 1999); however, many participants 
in the current study explicitly stated that they endorsed certain items because of their current 
context (i.e., being in jail), and not necessarily because of traumas or their offence.  Examples of 
these items include questions regarding trust, being on guard, believing the world is a dangerous 
place, having no future (i.e., “criminal record”), feeling like an object not a person (i.e., labeled a 
‘criminal’), as well as questions regarding poor sleep (e.g., uncomfortable bunks, noises on unit, 
flashlight during ‘count’), and fear of men (e.g., other offenders).  A total of 17 participants 
chose to leave their response to the sex related items on the TSC blank (i.e., not feeling satisfied 
with your sex life, having sex that you didn't enjoy, bad thoughts or feelings during sex, sexual 
feelings when you shouldn't have them), stating that these did not apply to them due to their 
context.  Participants were cued to respond to the PTCI in the context of their crime, whereas the 
TSC was meant to capture any trauma symptoms (related to offence or not).  Overall, it remains 
uncertain and difficult to untangle whether their reported cognitions or trauma symptoms were 
based on the offence, past traumas, or based on being involved in the justice system.  Given the 
apparent group differences (between ‘victims in the community’ and ‘offenders in custody’) in 
the interpretations of words or items, these may have been responded to in a different context 
and for a different purpose than for which they were originally developed.  Therefore, it is 
possible that these scales do not measure the latent constructs they were initially intended to 
measure (Furr, 2011; Tucker, Ozer, Lyubomirsky, & Boehm, 2006).  As a result, the findings 
below involving these constructs may be compromised, and should be interpreted with these 





CHAPTER 3: Results 
3.1 Description of Offenders’ Memories 
 As described in the Procedure section, participants were asked during the instructions 
whether they sometimes get unwanted thoughts or memories of a crime they committed.  If they 
responded yes, then they were asked to keep that in mind, and if not, then they were just 
encouraged to think of a crime they committed that “felt important to them in some way.”  
Participant responses were written in field notes: 30% said yes, 40% said no, and 30% were 
unsure.  Throughout the course of their answers to questionnaire items, it became apparent that 
this initial question did not produce accurate responses.  Specifically, many participants did not 
have a good understanding of what these ‘unwanted memories’ might look like until they read 
more specific questionnaire items, or had not reflected on this before this experience and had 
limited insight into their own thought and memory processes.  These responses were not used as 
an official measure of intrusive memories (endorsement of defining criteria items was used for 
more reliable prevalence rates, as discussed below) but were still useful to orient the participants 
to the questionnaire package and topic of study.  
Participants reported the offence type for the crime that they had in mind, and this was 
the offence focused on throughout the questionnaire package.  Many participants (63%) chose to 
focus on the crime for which they were currently serving time, but some chose older crimes – 
with the age of the memory/crime ranging from being within the last two years to as long as 27 
years ago (see Table 2.1).  The majority (69%) discussed crimes that were their index offence or 
were of a comparable crime type as their index offence.  Those that discussed different crimes 
often chose a crime of greater severity than their index offence (e.g., index of breach or 
possession but chose assault, robbery, or attempted murder to refer to for the purpose of the 
study questionnaire).  A quarter of the offences disclosed were reportedly conducted while under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol.  Many participants reported some aspects of intrusive 
memories related to the crime: distressing memories (62%); involuntarily triggered (84%); 
and/or recurrent (58%).  Only a proportion of these, however, met the ‘three-criteria defining 
threshold’ for intrusive memories, described below. 
3.1.1 1a) Prevalence of Intrusive Memories 
Based on previous findings (Evans et al., 2007b; Gray et al., 2003; Musker, 2013; 
Pollock, 1999; Spitzer et al., 2001; Welfare & Hollin, 2015), it was anticipated that 
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approximately 35–50% of adult offenders would report intrusive memories.  A total of 43% of 
participants in the current study reported intrusive memories (recurrent, distressing, and 
involuntarily triggered memories) for the crime they had committed.  Intrusive memories were 
reported across all offence types (see Table 2.1). 
3.1.2 1b) Description of Intrusive Memories 
Intrusive memories were expected to involve sensory components, and be triggered by 
cues related to the crime (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Evans et al., 2007b).  Intrusive memories in the 
current sample did involve sensory components, whereby 93% reported visual elements (see 
something in the memory), 64% auditory (hear something), 28% olfactory (smell something), 
60% tactile (touch something), and 21% sense of taste (taste something).  In terms of 
cues/triggers of the intrusive memories, 28% reported being cued by the environment, 16% by 
their thoughts, and 56% by a mix of both.  A total of 23% of participants reported experiencing 
flashbacks (i.e., recurrent, distressing, and involuntarily triggered memories, with a specific 
reliving/re-experiencing component to them) regarding their crime. 
3.1.3 1c) Impact of Event and Intrusive Memories 
Scores on the IES Intrusion subscale, which measures intrusive symptoms, were 
positively correlated with the dichotomous measure of intrusive memories based on defining 
criteria (see Table 3.1).  All further analyses were conducted on both measures wherever 
possible.  In an effort to account for the ‘messiness’ of trauma, all analyses reported below were 
also going to be conducted with trauma symptoms (TSC-40) being controlled.  To explore this 
plan, analyses were conducted both with and without this control, and generally speaking, the 
results were similar (see Appendix P). Given those limitations noted above regarding the 
reliability of the TSC measure with the current sample, and the enhanced clarity of the 
interpretation when not including it, the results that are reported below are without the inclusion 
of this control. 
Participants in the current sample had the following mean scores: intrusions (M = 14.02, 
SD = 8.79); avoidance (M = 15.06, SD = 9.82); and total impact of event (M = 29.08, SD = 
16.29).  It was expected that intrusive symptoms would be related to higher levels of stress and 
avoidance symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010).  Correlational 
analyses were conducted on both the continuous and dichotomous measures of intrusive 
memories, stress related to the offence (as measured by the EEQ), and avoidance (as measured 
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by the IES) – see Table 3.1.  Higher scores on both measures of intrusive memories were related 
to both higher stress ratings and high frequency of avoidance symptoms.  Higher ratings of stress 
related to the offence were also related to higher frequency of avoidance symptoms. When asked 
to rate the level of stress associated with the offence in question on a 7-point scale (from not at 
all stressful to extremely traumatic), 72% of the participants with intrusive memories rated the 
event as 5 or higher (M = 5.09, SD = 1.34).  A total of 74% of participants felt like the 
offence/event in question was a central part of their life story. 
Table 3.1   
Correlations between Intrusion Symptoms, Intrusive Memories, Stress Rating of the Offence, and 
Avoidance Symptoms   
 Intrusions IM Stress Avoidance 
Intrusions --- .47*** .51*** .53*** 
Intrusive 
Memories 
 --- .32* .30* 
Stress   --- .25* 
*p < .05, **p < .004, *** p < .001 
Note: IM = Intrusive Memories (higher values indicate yes/present) 
 
3.2 Factors That May Influence Offenders’ Intrusive Memories 
3.2.1 2a) Shame and Guilt   
We were interested in examining how feelings of shame and guilt regarding the offence 
relate to offenders’ intrusive memories.  Total scores from the TRSI and the GBAI-R guilt 
subscale were used as continuous measures of shame (M = 22.55, SD = 17.44) and guilt (M = 
72.26, SD = 21.66), respectively, to assess offenders’ feelings regarding their offence.  As 
expected (see Gray et al., 2003; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010), correlational analyses revealed 
that guilt and shame are highly positively correlated with each other (see Table 3.2).  Both were 
also positively correlated with intrusive memories as measured by both the IES Intrusions 
subscale and the dichotomous measure.  To further inform our understanding of these 
relationships, we also examined PTCI negative cognitions of self and the world subscales.  
Scores on the negative cognitions of self subscale (M = 2.29, SD = 1.06) were positively 
correlated with all variables in these analyses, and scores on the negative cognitions of the world 
subscale (M = 4.58, SD = 1.50) were positively related to shame.  It was unknown how long 
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participants had been in custody (i.e., length of sentence and when it started was not known); 
therefore, it is unclear how long they were feeling shame/guilt, and what the impact of this 
experience had on the participant’s self-appraisals and overall well-being (e.g., effect of feeling 
shame for one month vs. one year).  
Table 3.2   
Correlations between Intrusive Memories, Shame, Guilt, and Negative Cognitions 
 Shame Guilt Neg Cog Self Neg Cog World 
Intrusions .58** .41** .45** .17 
Intrusive Memories .51** .47** .30* .16 
Shame -- .75** .56** .23* 
Guilt -- -- .32* .03 
*p < .05, **p < .001 
Note: Intrusive Memories – higher values indicate yes/present; Neg Cog Self = Negative 
Cognitions of Self; Neg Cog World = Negative Cognitions of the World 
 
3.2.2 2b) Effect of Shame   
Partial correlations were used to examine whether the relationship between guilt and 
intrusive memories would still be present once we controlled for shame (Crisford et al., 2008; 
Robinaugh & McNally, 2010).  It was also of interest to see what role negative cognitions had in 
these relationships once shame was partialled out.  As predicted, these results were non-
significant for both the IES intrusions subscale and the dichotomous measure (see Table 3.3).  
When controlling for shame, more negative views of the world were related to less guilt 
regarding the offence.  
Table 3.3   
Partial Correlations of Intrusive Memories, Guilt, and Negative Cognitions, when Controlling 
for Shame 
 Guilt Neg Cog Self Neg Cog World 
Intrusions -.05 .19 .05 
Intrusive Memories .16 .03 .06 
Guilt -- -.17 -.23* 
*p < .05 
Note: Intrusive Memories – higher values indicate yes/present 
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The effect of shame was further confirmed in a multiple regression analysis which 
examined if shame, guilt, and/or negative cognitions (predictors) were significant predictors of 
intrusive memories as reported on the IES intrusion subscale (criterion).  The overall regression 
was significant, and revealed that these variables accounted for 36% of the variance in intrusive 
memories (see Table 3.4).  Shame emerged as a significant predictor of intrusive memories, 
whereas these other variables did not. 
Table 3.4   
Multiple Regression Examining Predictors of Intrusive Memories 
 B SE β t p sr2 
Shame 2.21 3.47 .50 3.46 .001 .08 
Guilt -0.01 0.05 -.03 -0.23 .822 .00 
Neg Cog Self 1.70 0.93 .20 1.83 .071 .02 
Neg Cog World -0.27 0.57 -.05 -0.47 .637 .00 
Overall Model F(4, 95) = 13.43, p < .001, R2 = .36 
A logistic regression analysis was also conducted to predict the presence/absence of 
intrusive memories (dichotomous measure) in this offender population using shame, guilt, and 
negative cognitions of self as predictors.  A test of the full model against a constant only model 
was statistically significant, indicating that these predictors as a set reliably distinguished 
between the presence or absence of intrusive memories, 2(3) = 32.35, p < .001.  Nagelkerke’s R2 
of .37 indicated a moderate relationship between prediction and grouping.  Prediction success 
overall was 73% (77% for absence of intrusive memories and 67% for their presence).  The 
Wald criterion demonstrated that only shame made a significant contribution to prediction (p = 
.044).  Guilt, and negative cognitions of the self, again, were not significant predictors of this 
dichotomous measure of intrusive memories (p = .110 and .660, respectively).  The EXP(B) 
value indicates that with every 1 point increase in shame scores, the odds ratio is 1.56 times as 
large and therefore offenders who experience shame regarding their offence are 1.56 times more 
likely to experience intrusive memories of it.  
3.2.3 3a) Offence Type, Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence, and Intrusive Memories 
It was expected that intrusive memories would be reported across all charges/offence 
types (Gray et al., 2003).  To examine this, offence types were collapsed into violent (weapons, 
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sexual, violent, and homicide offences) vs. non-violent (i.e., motor vehicle, property, and drug 
offences – with administrative of justice offences being dropped from analyses as there are only 
2 cases of it).  An independent t-test of the type of the offence reported on the continuous 
measure of intrusive memories was not significant, t(96) = 1.75, p = .083, 95% CI [-0.42, 6.68].  
Similarly, a chi-square examining if there were differences in intrusive memories (yes/no) 
between violent/non-violent offences was not significant, 2 (1) = .17, p = .680, Cramer’s V = 
.04.  These findings suggest that intrusive memories do not discriminate between offence types, 
and that other factors are at play in the experience of intrusive memories.   
Post-hoc MANOVAs were conducted on shame, guilt, and instrumentality-reactivity by 
offence category to explore this possibility further.  Results revealed a significant difference in 
levels of shame, F(1, 96) = 4.96, p = .028, ηp2 = .05; and reactivity, F(1, 96) = 33.59, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .26, reported between violent and non-violent offences.  Specifically, violent offences were 
more reactive in nature and related to higher shame ratings compared to non-violent offences 
(see Table 3.5).  There were no significant differences in levels of guilt between offence types, 
F(1, 96) = 1.27, p = .263, ηp2 = .01.   
Table 3.5   
Comparisons of Mean Shame, Guilt, and Instrumentality-Reactivity Scores by Offence Type 
  N Mean (SD) 
Shame Total Violent Offence 42 4.85 (2.09) a 
Non-Violent Offence 56 3.96 (1.84) a 
Guilt Total  Violent Offence 42 75.29 (23.27) 
Non-Violent Offence 56 70.27 (20.66) 
IRO-Q Total Violent Offence 42 86.69 (16.78) b 
Non-Violent Offence 56 64.68 (19.96) b  
a p < .030, b p < .001 
 
3.2.4 3b) Instrumentality-Reactivity of Offence and Intrusive Memories 
Correlational analyses were conducted to explore whether the instrumentality-reactivity 
of the offence was related to intrusive memories (see Table 3.6).  As predicted, a positive 
correlation was found between the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence and the intrusions 
subscale, whereby intrusive symptoms were related to offences that were more reactive in nature.  
This relationship was only marginally significant for the dichotomous measure of intrusive 
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memories.  When examining individual factors, anger, dysphoria, and a lack of planned control 
during the offence were positively related to intrusive symptoms.  Only dysphoria, which 
consists of emotions felt such as embarrassed, ashamed, sad, afraid, helpless, and inferior, was 
related to the dichotomous measure of intrusive memories, with higher levels of dysphoria at the 
time of the offence being associated with the presence of intrusive memories. 
Table 3.6   





Anger Dysphoria Lacking Planned 
Control 
Intrusions .39*** .32** .36*** .22** 
Intrusive 
Memories 
.19* .12 .22** .10 
*p = .059, ** p < .05, *** p < .001 
Note: Intrusive Memories – higher values indicate yes/present 
 
Follow-up regression analysis on these individual factors and intrusive symptoms was 
significant, and revealed that these variables accounted for 17% of the variance in intrusive 
memories (see Table 3.7).  However, dysphoria emerged as a significant unique predictor of 
intrusive memories. 
Table 3.7   
Multiple Regression Examining Anger, Dysphoria, and Planned Control as Predictors of 
Intrusive Memories 
 B SE β t p sr2 
Anger 0.14 0.09 .16 1.50 .137 .02 
Dysphoria 0.31 0.12 .27 2.63 .010 .06 
Lack of Planned Control 0.09 0.10 .09 0.90 .371 .01 
Overall Model F(3, 96) = 6.66, p < .001, R2 = .17 
 
3.2.5 3c) Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence, Shame, and Intrusive Memories.  
It was expected that the more reactive the crime, the more shame experienced, and that 
both of these factors would lead to the development of intrusive memories.  Therefore, a 
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mediation analysis was conducted in order to examine whether instrumentality-reactivity of the 
offence (X) had an impact on intrusive symptoms (Y) because of shame (mediator) – see Figure 
3.2.  This mediation analysis was approached as per the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986).  Results indicated that instrumentality-reactivity of the offence was a significant correlate 
of shame (a), and that shame was a significant correlate of intrusive symptoms (b).  These results 
support the mediational hypothesis. The instrumentality-reactivity of the offence was still a 
significant correlate of intrusive symptoms after controlling for the mediator, shame (c’), but to a 
lesser extent than the initial path (c).  These results are consistent with a partial mediation.  
Approximately 37% of the variance in intrusive symptoms was accounted for by these variables.  
The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 1000 samples 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  These results indicated that the indirect coefficient was significant, B 
= .08, SE = .02, 95% CI [0.04, 0.13].  Committing an offence that was more reactive in nature 
was associated with approximately .08 points higher intrusion scores as mediated by shame. 
 
 
Figure 3.1   
Relationship between Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence and Intrusive Symptoms as 
Partially Mediated by Shame 
 
3.2.6 4a) Emotionality and Avoidance  
It was expected that avoidance would be related to both ratings of stress regarding the 
event, as well as ratings of emotions at the time of the offence (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 
1976).  Correlational analyses confirmed that the higher the experiences of anger and dysphoria 
(as measured by the I-ROQ) at the time of the crime, the more stress (as measured by the EEQ) 
reported regarding the offence (see Table 3.8).  In addition, the higher the ratings of stress and 
c' 
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dysphoria, the more avoidance (IES) reported.  Anger during the offence was not significantly 
related to avoidance symptoms.  
Table 3.8   
Correlations between Emotionality During Offence, Stress, Shame, and Avoidance 
 Stress Shame Avoidance 
Anger During Offence .21* .20* .13 
Dysphoria During Offence .38*** .45*** .30** 
Stress -- .48*** .25* 
Shame -- -- .52*** 
*p < .05, **p = .002, ***p < .001 
 
Follow-up regression analysis on dysphoria, stress, and shame on avoidance was 
significant, and revealed that these variables accounted for 28% of the variance in avoidance (see 
Table 3.9).  Shame emerged as a significant unique predictor of avoidance, whereas these other 
two predictors did not. 
Table 3.9   
Multiple Regression Examining Dysphoria, Stress, and Shame as Predictors of Avoidance 
Symptoms 
 B SE β t p sr2 
Dysphoria 0.11 0.13 .08 0.83 .406 .00 
Stress -0.08 0.55 -.01 -0.14 .892 .00 
Shame 2.42 0.52 .49 4.67 .000 .16 
Overall Model F(3, 96) = 12.23, p < .001, R2 = .28 
 
3.2.7 4b) Stress, Avoidance, and Intrusive Memories 
It was expected that the effect of the level of stress of the event on intrusive memories 
would be mediated by avoidance response/coping (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986).  
A mediation analysis was conducted in order to examine whether the stress rating of the event 
(X) has an impact on intrusive symptoms (Y) because of avoidance (mediator) – see Figure 3.3.  
This mediation analysis was approached as per the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  
The results indicated that stress ratings were a significant correlate of avoidance (a), and that 
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avoidance was a significant correlate of intrusive symptoms (b). These results support the 
mediational hypothesis.  Stress rating was still a significant correlate of intrusive symptoms after 
controlling for the mediator, avoidance (c’), but to a lesser extent than the initial path (c).  These 
results are consistent with a partial mediation.  Approximately 44% of the variance in intrusive 
symptoms was accounted for by the variables (R2 = .44).  The indirect effect was tested using a 
bootstrap estimation approach with 1000 samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  These results 
indicated that the indirect coefficient was significant, B = .53, SE = .24, 95% CI [0.13, 1.08].  
Higher stress ratings of the offence event were associated with approximately 0.53 points higher 








Figure 3.2   
Relationship between Stress Rating of Offence Event and Intrusive Symptoms as Partially 
Mediated by Avoidance Response/Coping  
 
3.2.8 5)  Most Significant Predictor(s) of Intrusive Memories 
The results above address the relationship between each individual factor of interest and 
intrusive memories, and allude to which factor may emerge as the most significant predictor of 
intrusive memories.  That being said, we were interested in the amount they each may 
incrementally predict when they are all included in the regression analysis.  Therefore, offence-
related guilt, instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, stress ratings of the event, and shame were 
each entered in turn as predictors of intrusive memories in a hierarchical (sequential) regression 
(see Table 3.10).  The overall model accounted for 43% of the variance in intrusive memories.  
The addition of each variable added incrementally to the overall prediction of intrusive memories 
at each step.  Once shame was included in the model, guilt and instrumentality-reactivity were no 
longer significant predictors.  With all predictors considered, stress ratings for the event and 
offence-related shame contributed to the frequency of intrusive memories over and above the 
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other primary factors of interest, with shame accounting for the most (8%) unique variance in 
intrusive memories. 
Table 3.10   
Hierarchical Regression of Guilt, Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence, and Shame on 
Intrusive Memories 
 B S.E. B β 95% CI sr2 
Step 1       
Constant 1.99 2.82     
Guilt 0.17 0.04 0.41** 0.09 0.24 0.17 
Step 2       
Constant -5.48 3.42     
Guilt 0.14 0.04 0.33** 0.06 0.21 0.10 
I-R 0.13 0.04 0.31** 0.06 0.21 0.09 
Step 3       
Constant -6.44 3.24     
Guilt 0.08 0.04 0.20* 0.01 0.16 0.03 
I-R 0.10 0.04 0.23* 0.02 0.17 0.04 
Stress 1.69 0.47 0.34** 0.76 2.62 0.09 
Step 4       
Constant -2.79 3.19     
Guilt -0.04 0.05 -1.02 -0.14 0.05 0.00 
I-R 0.07 0.04 0.15 -0.01 0.14 0.02 
Stress 1.38 0.45 0.28* 0.50 2.27 0.06 
Shame 2.06 0.55 0.46** 0.97 3.15 0.08 
Note: I-R = Instrumentality-Reactivity; * p < .05, ** p ≤ .001.  
R2 = .17 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .09 for Step 2 (p = .001); ΔR2 = .09 for Step 3 (p < .001); ΔR2 = .08 
for Step 4 (p < .001), Overall R2 = .43  
 
Sequential logistic regression was also used to explore which was the most significant 
predictor of the dichotomous measure of intrusive memories (see Table 3.11).  A test of the full 
model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that these predictors 
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as a set reliably distinguished between the presence or absence of intrusive memories.  
Nagelkerke’s R2 indicated a moderate relationship between prediction and grouping.  With the 
exception of shame, the addition of each variable did not add incrementally to the overall 
prediction of intrusive memories.  The overall model increased prediction success from 57% 
(Block 0) to 72% in the last Block (77% for absence of intrusive memories and 65% for their 
presence).  The final Wald criterion demonstrated that, when all variables were considered, only 
shame made a significant unique contribution to prediction.  The EXP(B) value in this model 
indicates that with every one point increase in shame scores, the odds ratio is 1.58 times as large; 
therefore, offenders who experience shame regarding their offence are 1.58 times more likely to 
experience intrusive memories of it.  The combination of these results from both the continuous 
and dichotomous measures of intrusive memories, highlight that shame emerges as the 
underlying significant predictor of intrusive memories over and above the other primary factors 
of interest in this study.  
Table 3.11   
Sequential Logistic Regression of Guilt, Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence, and Shame on 
Intrusive Memories 
 
B S.E. Wald p Exp(B) 
95% CI. for 
EXP(B) 
Block 1 Constant -4.39 1.00 19.19 .000 0.01   
 Guilt  0.05 0.01 18.52 .000 1.06 1.03 1.08 
Block 2 Constant -5.00 1.25 16.02 .000 0.01   
 Guilt  0.05 0.01 16.91 .000 1.05 1.03 1.08 
 I-R 0.01 0.01 0.76 .382 1.01 .99 1.03 
Block 3 Constant -5.11 1.26 16.42 .000 0.01   
 Guilt  0.05 0.01 12.74 .000 1.05 1.02 1.08 
 I-R 0.01 0.01 0.29 .591 1.01 .98 1.03 
 Stress 0.16 0.15 1.15 .283 1.18 .87 1.59 
Block 4 Constant -4.54 1.28 12.52 .000 0.01   
 Guilt  0.02 0.02 2.11 .146 1.02 .99 1.06 
 I-R 0.00 0.01 0.00 .972 1.00 .97 1.03 
 Stress 0.09 0.16 0.31 .575 1.09 .80 1.50 
 Shame  0.46 0.21 4.96 .026 1.58 1.06 2.37 
Overall Model:   2(4) = 32.49 p < .001, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .37 
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3.2.8.1 Shame mediated by avoidance.  Theoretically, avoidance coping can 
paradoxically reinforce the experience of intrusive memories, particularly if negative emotions 
and cognitions regarding the self, like shame, are involved.  Given the findings in 4a, 4b and 5 
above, a post-hoc mediation was conducted to explore the role of avoidance (mediator) in the 
relationship between shame (X) and intrusive symptoms (Y) – see Figure 3.4.  These results 
indicated that shame ratings were a significant correlate of avoidance (a), and that avoidance was 
a significant correlate of intrusive symptoms (b).  These results support the mediational 
hypothesis.  Shame rating was still a significant correlate of intrusive symptoms after controlling 
for the mediator, avoidance (c’), but to a lesser extent than the initial path (c).  These results are 
consistent with a partial mediation.  Approximately 41% of the variance in intrusive symptoms 
was accounted for by the variables (R2 = .41).  The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrap 
estimation approach with 1000 samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  These results indicated the 
indirect coefficient was significant, B = 0.73, SE = 0.26, 95% CI [0.30, 1.31].  Higher shame 
scores were associated with approximately 0.73 points higher intrusive symptoms scores as 
mediated by avoidance symptoms.  
 
 
Figure 3.3   
Relationship between Shame and Intrusive Symptoms as Partially Mediated by Avoidance 
Response/Coping 
 
3.2.9 6)  Accuracy of Predicting the Presence of Intrusive Memories 
Post-hoc ROC analyses were also conducted to further examine the relationship between 
all relevant primary and secondary variables explored (intrusions, avoidance, shame, guilt, 
instrumentality-reactivity of the offence, emotionality, stress, trauma symptoms, and 
posttraumatic cognitions), specifically assessing their accuracy in predicting intrusive memories 
c' 
B = 2.58** 
B = 2.71** 
c a b 





B = 1.84** 
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in this adult offender population (see Table 3.12).  The confidence intervals for each of these 
individual predictors all overlap, meaning they are likely sampling from the same sampling 
population parameter.  Results of the ROC (interpreted as recommended by Rice & Harris, 2005) 
revealed that avoidance symptoms, dysphoria during offence, stress rating of offence, and 
negative cognitions of self each individually predicted intrusive memories (as determined by the 
defining criteria) with medium accuracy (i.e., corresponding to Cohen’s d > .50).  Intrusion 
symptoms (which up to this point have been used as the continuous measure of intrusive 
memories), the total impact of the event, shame regarding offence, guilt regarding offence, and 
trauma symptoms, all predicted intrusive memories with strong accuracy (i.e., corresponding to 
Cohen’s d > .80).  These latter factors have greater point precision on their prediction (i.e., less 
error as reflected by the smaller widths or narrowness of the confidence intervals. 
Table 3.12   
Accuracy of Intrusive Memories Prediction 
 AUC SE p 95% CI 
Intrusion Symptoms .78 0.05 .000 0.69 0.87 
Avoidance Symptoms .68 0.05 .002 0.58 0.78 
Total Impact of Event .75 0.05 .000 0.66 0.85 
Shame Regarding Offence .80 0.04 .000 0.71 0.89 
Guilt Regarding Offence .77 0.05 .000 0.68 0.87 
Instrumentality-Reactivity .62 0.06 .043 0.51 0.73 
Anger During Offence .57 0.06 .203 0.46 0.69 
Dysphoria During Offence .64 0.05 .016 0.53 0.75 
Lack of Planned Control .56 0.06 .276 0.45 0.68 
Stress Rating of Offence/Event .67 0.05 .003 0.57 0.78 
Trauma Symptoms .71 0.05 .000 0.61 0.81 
Negative Cognitions of Self .68 0.05 .002 0.57 0.78 
3.3 Secondary Questions of Interest 
3.3.1 7a) Intrusive Memories and Institutional Violence 
A total of 27% of participants reported being involved in incident(s) of institutional 
violence (count ranged from 1 to 17).  Given that irritability is sometimes associated with PTSD 
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symptomology (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers & Steil, 1995), it was expected that this may be 
expressed as anger or a violent response – specifically it was hypothesized that offenders 
experiencing intrusive symptoms would be more likely to engage in institutional violence (as 
measured by binary yes/no of this variable – higher scores indicate the occurrence of institutional 
violence).  This hypothesis was supported for the continuous measure of intrusive memories, but 
not the dichotomous measure (see Table 3.13).  Follow-up ROC analyses were conducted on the 
continuous measures of intrusive memories and the binary measure of institutional violence 
(with higher scores represent yes/present), revealing a small (AUC = .62; corresponding to 
Cohen’s d > .30), but non-significant (p = .064), effect for predictive accuracy (see Table 3.14).   
3.3.2 7b) Shame and Institutional Violence 
It was anticipated that offenders reporting higher levels of shame would have higher rates 
of institutional violence (Hosser et al., 2008).  Correlational analysis examining the relationship 
between these two variables was not significant; thus, this hypothesis was not supported (see 
Table 3.13).  To further inform our understanding of the relationship between these variables, 
correlational analyses were also conducted on guilt and the negative cognitions subscales.  
Lower offence-related guilt scores were correlated with the occurrence of institutional violence.  
Neither negative cognitions of self or negative cognitions of the world were related to 
institutional violence. 
  
Table 3.13   















--- .21** .02 -.10 -.21** .17 .16 .03 .18 -.16 .01 
SRP Total .39*** .04 .01 -.01 -.35*** .33*** .48*** -.03 .21** -.11 -.23** 
SRP 
Interpersonal 
.23** .02 .04 .07 -.21** .37*** .50*** -.01 .18* -.07 -.17* 
SRP 
Affective 
.37*** .03 -.10 -.01 -.26** .27** .40*** .01 .20 -.13 .10 
SRP  
Lifestyle 
.41*** .08 .03 -.01 -.32*** .28** .43** -.01 .21* .03 -.23* 
SRP 
Antisocial 
.29** .12 .09 .05 -.26** .25** .26** -.06 .09 -.04 -.21** 
Note: Inst.Viol. = Institutional Violence; IM = Intrusive Memories (Higher scores of Inst. Viol and IM indicate yes/present) 
Neg Cog Self = Negative Cognitions of Self; Neg Cog World = Negative Cognitions of the World; I-R = Instrumentality-Reactivity  





3.3.3 8) Psychopathy and Institutional Violence 
Participants in the current sample had the following mean psychopathy scores: total score 
(M = 75.11, SD = 21.52); interpersonal (M = 16.26, SD = 6.91); affective (M = 17.79, SD = 
5.69); lifestyle (M = 21.36, SD = 6.23); and antisocial (M = 20.36, SD = 5.33).  These scores are 
on par with the mean scores of a sample of Wisconsin male prison inmates (see Paulhus et al., 
2015).  Given the facets of psychopathy and their relationship with violence and recidivism, it 
was expected that higher levels of psychopathy would be related to engagement in institutional 
violence.  Findings from correlational analyses supported this hypothesis across all SRP facet 
and total scores (see Table 3.13).  Follow-up ROC analyses were conducted (see Table 3.14).  
Total psychopathy scores, as well as affective and lifestyle facet scores, provided the strongest 
predictive accuracy of institutional violence (corresponding to Cohen’s d > .80; Rice & Harris, 
2005), whereas interpersonal and antisocial facets predicted the occurrence of institutional 
violence with medium accuracy (i.e., corresponding to Cohen’s d > .50).     
Table 3.14   
Accuracy of Predicting the Occurrence of Institutional Violence  
 AUC SE p 95% CI 
Intrusion Symptoms .62 0.06 .064 0.51 0.73 
Guilt Regarding Offence .38 0.06 .068 0.25 0.51 
SRP Total .75 0.05 .000 0.65 0.85 
SRP Interpersonal .65 0.06 .026 0.53 0.76 
SRP Affective .76 0.05 .000 0.66 0.86 
SRP Lifestyle .75 0.05 .000 0.66 0.85 
SRP Antisocial .66 0.06 .013 0.54 0.79 
Follow-up logistic regression analysis was used to explore which aspect of psychopathy 
was the most significant predictor of the dichotomous measure of institutional violence (see 
Table 3.15).  A test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, 
indicating that these predictors as a set reliably distinguished between the presence or absence of 
institutional violence.  Nagelkerke’s R2 indicated a moderate relationship between prediction and 
grouping.  Prediction success overall was 79% (92% for absence of institutional violence, and 
44% for its presence).  The Wald criterions demonstrated that only the affect and lifestyle facets 
made a significant unique contribution to prediction.  The interpersonal and antisocial facets of 
psychopathy were not significant predictors of this dichotomous measure of institutional 
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violence once the other facets were accounted for.  The EXP(B) values in this model indicate that 
with every one point increase in affect scores, the odds ratio is 1.14 times as large and therefore 
offenders with flatter affective traits are 1.14 times more likely to engage in institutional 
violence.  Similarly, with every one point increase in lifestyle scores, the odds ratio is 1.17 times 
as large; therefore, offenders with higher parasitic lifestyle traits are 1.17 times more likely to 
engage in institutional violence. 
Table 3.15   
Logistic Regression Results of Psychopathy Facets on Institutional Violence 
 B S.E. Wald p Exp(B) 
95% CI.for 
EXP(B) 
Interpersonal -0.10 0.05 3.12 .077 0.91 0.81 1.01 
Affect 0.13 0.06 4.34 .037 1.14 1.01 1.28 
Lifestyle 0.16 0.07 5.46 .019 1.17 1.02 1.33 
Antisocial 0.09 0.06 2.51 .113 1.09 0.98 1.22 
Constant -7.24 1.65 19.31 .000 0.00   
 Overall Model:  2(4) = 24.78, p < .001, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .32 
 
3.3.4 9a) Psychopathy, Guilt, and Shame 
Given that individuals high in psychopathy are known to possess characteristics contrary 
to shame, such as glibness, lack of remorse, and lack of empathy, it was expected that there 
would be a negative relationship between psychopathy and both shame and guilt.  Correlational 
analyses on SRP total and facet scores, revealed that this was true for guilt, but not for shame 
(see Table 3.13).  To further inform our understanding of the relationship between these 
variables, correlational analyses were also conducted on psychopathy and the negative cognitions 
subscales.  These negative cognition scores were positively correlated with total and facet scores 
of psychopathy, whereby higher psychopathy scores were related to more endorsement of 
negative cognitions about the self and the world (see Table 3.13). 
3.3.5 9b) Psychopathy and the Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence 
It was expected that psychopathy may be related to the instrumentality-reactivity of the 
offence committed (Blais et al., 2014; Cornell et al., 1996; Pollock, 1999).  Instrumental violence 
has been found to be typical of offenders who are high in psychopathy; however, Blais and 
colleagues (2014) found this connection to be true for the Interpersonal facet only.  To examine 
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this inconsistency, correlational analyses were conducted on the SRP total score, as well as facet 
scores, and the overall instrumentality-reactivity of the offence and the individual factors (anger, 
dysphoria, lacking planned control; see Table 3.13).  There were no significant relationships 
between psychopathy scores and the overall instrumentality-reactivity of the offence.  Higher 
total scores of psychopathy were positively correlated with anger, and negatively correlated with 
lacking planned control, indicating that higher scores in psychopathy were related to feelings of 
anger during the offence as well as more planning and control of the offence. The interpersonal 
and lifestyle facets were trending towards being related to anger and planned control during the 
offence, whereas the antisocial facet had the strongest relationship with planned control during 
the offence.  Follow-up regression analysis of the facet scores on planned control was not 
significant, F(4, 95) = 1.76, p = .144, R2 = .07. 
3.3.6 9c) Psychopathy and Intrusive Memories 
Given the anticipated relationships between psychopathy, the instrumentality-reactivity 
of the offence, and guilt/shame, it was hypothesized that psychopathy may potentially serve as a 
protective factor for intrusive memories whereby higher scores on the psychopathy measure 
would be inversely related to intrusive memories.  In order to assess what role psychopathy has 
on intrusive memories, correlational analyses were conducted on psychopathy and its facets, and 
both the continuous and dichotomous measures of intrusive memories.  Contrary to what was 
expected, no significant relationships were found between these variables (see Table 3.13); 
therefore, no further analyses were conducted.  
3.4 Recall Perspective Taken for Emotional Events 
3.4.1 10)  Emotionality, Avoidance and Recall Perspective 
There are mixed findings regarding emotionality, the role of avoidance, and which 
perspective is more likely to be taken when remembering an event (Berntsen et al., 2003; Porter 
& Birt, 2001; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010).  Although specific hypotheses about these 
relationships were not made, chi-square analyses were conducted on categorical recall 
perspective (field/mix/observer) and dichotomous emotion and avoidance levels (low/high – 
based on median-split scores of the scales).  None of these relationships were significant at the 
.05 level (see Table 3.16).    
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Table 3.16   
Chi-Square Examining Relationship Between Emotionality, Avoidance, and Recall Perspective 
 Recall Perspective 
 % Field Only % Mixed % Observer 
Low Avoidance 53.1 36.7 10.2 
High Avoidance 57.1 34.7 8.2 
Low Stress 67.4 25.6 7.0 
High Stress 45.5 43.6 10.9 
Low Anger 57.1 30.6 12.2 
High Anger 53.1 40.8 6.1 
Low Dysphoria 55.1 36.7 8.2 
High Dysphoria 55.1 34.7 10.2 
Avoidance:  2 (2) = .21, p = .899, Cramer’s V = .05 
Stress: 2 (2) = 4.73, p = .094, Cramer’s V = .22 
Anger: 2 (2) = 1.79, p = .409, Cramer’s V = .13 
Dysphoria: 2 (2) = .14, p = .933, Cramer’s V = .04 
3.4.2 11a) Intrusive Memories and Recall Perspective 
We were interested in exploring what perspective is taken when recalling intrusive 
memories.  The relationship between recall perspective and intrusive memories was first 
explored with chi-square analyses conducted on the categorical recall perspective 
(field/mix/observer) and dichotomous intrusive memories (yes/no).  There was a significant 
association between intrusive memories and what recall perspective is taken, 2 (2) = 8.90, p = 
.012, Cramer’s V = .30 (see Table 3.17).  Post-hoc examination of the adjusted residuals for this 
medium effect revealed that a higher than expected proportion of participants experiencing 
intrusive memories reported a mixed perspective (z = .30), whereas a higher than expected 







Table 3.17   
Recall Perspective for Offence Reported for Total Sample and for Intrusive Memories 
Recall Perspective Total Sample Participants with IM No IM 
 % % % 
Field Only 55.1 17.3 37.8 
Mix Field/Observer 35.7 22.4 13.3 
Observer Only 9.2 3.1 6.1 
Note: IM = Intrusive Memories 
 
3.4.3 11b) Intrusive Memories, Emotionality, and Recall Perspective 
It was expected that the directionality of the relationship between recall type and 
intrusive memories may depend on the offender’s coping mechanisms (whether attempts at 
avoidance are made).  Given the theoretical relevance of emotion in the relationship between 
recall perspective and intrusive memories, it was also anticipated that this relationship may vary 
by the emotions during and after the offence.  Therefore, chi-square analyses examining the 
relationship between recall perspective and intrusive memories were conducted with the different 
emotions (median-split scores of the scales – low/high) added as layer variables (see Table 3.18).  
The results revealed that the significance of the relationship between intrusive memories 
and recall perspective was dependant on the levels of offence-related shame (i.e., in those with 
high shame: 65% of those with no intrusive memories reported field perspective, while 54% of 
those with intrusive memories reported mixed perspective).  The significance of the relationship 
between intrusive memories and perspective was also dependant on the levels of offence-related 
guilt (i.e., in those with low guilt: 65% of those with no intrusive memories reported field 
perspective, while 64% of those with intrusive memories reported mixed perspective); and anger 
at the time of the offence (i.e., in those low anger: 68% of those with no intrusive memories 
reported field perspective, while 56% of those with intrusive memories reported mixed 
perspective).  The significance of the relationship between intrusive memories and perspective 
varied by both levels of avoidance symptoms (i.e., in those with low avoidance 64% of those 
with no intrusive memories reported field perspective, while 61% of those with intrusive 
memories reported mixed perspective; and in those with high avoidance: 70% of those with no 
intrusive memories reported field perspective, while those with intrusive memories reported a 
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split between field and mixed perspective – both 48%).  There was no evidence to suggest that 
the relationship between intrusive memories and recall perspective varied across levels of 
dysphoria at the time of the offence or levels of stress ratings.  These findings suggest that the 
relationship between recall and intrusive memories is related to levels of shame, guilt, anger 
during the offence, and avoidance coping.   
Table 3.18   
Relationship between Recall Perspective, Intrusive Memories, and Offence-Related Emotions 
 Recall Perspective 
Field Only vs. Mixed vs. Observer Only 
 2 Cramer’s V p 
IM 8.90 .30 .012 
IM x Low Shame 1.72 .19 .423 
IM x High Shame 6.28 .35 .043 
IM x Low Guilt 6.30 .36 .043 
IM x High Guilt 3.91 .28 .141 
IM x Low Anger 8.48 .42 .014 
IM x High Anger 2.50 .23 .287 
IM x Low Dysphoria 3.90 .28 .142 
IM x High Dysphoria 5.73 .34 .057 
IM x Low Avoidance 6.43 .36 .040 
IM x High Avoidance 6.69 .37 .035 
IM x Low Stress 3.05 .27 .218 
IM x High Stress 4.75 .29 .093 




CHAPTER 4: Discussion 
 The current study sought to assess the prevalence of offence-related intrusive memories 
in a sample of male provincially sentenced offenders, to examine possible factors related to the 
development of intrusive memories, and to explore various secondary questions of interest 
regarding psychopathy and institutional violence.  Based on the importance of emotionality, 
distinctiveness of the event, and the clash of the event with the individual’s life-script, it was 
thought that offence-related shame and the reactivity of the offence would contribute to the 
development of intrusive memories.  These kinds of connections are widely accepted in the 
larger trauma literature but little was known about perpetrator-induced trauma in offender 
populations.  In addition, past research examining offence-related trauma symptoms had been 
limited to forensic psychiatric patient and/or violent offender populations.  The results of the 
current study regarding intrusive memories, shame, and reactive violence are discussed in turn 
below.  Some additional considerations are explored, as well as limitations, future directions, and 
the implications of this study.  
4.1 Intrusive Memories 
A total of 43% of offenders in the current sample reported experiencing intrusive 
memories of their offence.  These memories were recurrent, distressing, and involuntarily 
triggered.  Intrusive memories were reported across various types of crime, some were violent 
(e.g., homicide, assault), and some were not (e.g., theft, driving under the influence of alcohol).  
The prevalence rate of intrusive memories in this offender sample was consistent with intrusive 
memories and PTSD rates found in previous research with forensic psychiatric patients, and 
serious violent offender populations (Chung et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2007b; Gray et al., 2003; 
Musker, 2013; Pollock, 1999; Welfare & Hollin, 2015).  These numbers reinforce the assertion 
that offenders do “suffer” with intrusive memories regarding their offence(s).  As expected, 
avoidance symptoms (e.g., not wanting to talk or think about the event, numbing emotions about 
it, etc.) were associated with the presence of intrusive memories.  The role of avoidance and 
emotion suppression is also consistent with theoretical foundations of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000; Rauch & Foa, 2006) and past research on offender PTSD (e.g., Chung et al., 2016; Gray et 
al., 2003). 
The current study measured symptoms of trauma (i.e., avoidance and intrusive 
memories), but did not assess individuals for diagnoses of PTSD as this was beyond the scope.  
That said, it has been suggested that mean total scores over 27 on the Impact of Event scale are 
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indicative of a 75% chance of PTSD (Coffey & Berglind, 2006).  The mean total score in the 
current study was 29.08 which lends support to the idea that a large number of participants may 
have had PTSD.  When looking at intrusion and avoidance symptoms, the mean scores in the 
current study (14.02 and 15.06, respectively) fell between Horowitz and colleagues’ (1979) 
normative sample mean scores of medical students (2.5 intrusion; 8.5 avoidance) and scores of 
stress clinic patients (21.0 intrusion; 35.3 avoidance).  These scores reported in the current study 
speak to the level of symptom severity in this offender sample.  In addition, almost a quarter of 
participants reported intrusive memories that involved re-experiencing elements, suggesting that 
they may have been experiencing flashbacks of the offence.  It is unclear whether any 
participants experienced any dissociation symptoms (feeling as if the world, or self, is not real) 
of their offence, as this was not measured.  It is possible that some of the offenders in the current 
sample had PTSD and that these intrusive memories and flashbacks may be only indicators or 
symptoms of a bigger problem.  Putting the current findings in the context of PTSD may assist in 
terms of using clinical practice language, assessing severity, and implementing treatment 
interventions.  This study’s exploration of intrusive memories in the general context of 
autobiographical memory and life events provides a greater understanding of the underlying 
variables/symptoms beyond the realm of strict diagnostic criteria.   
Although the present findings suggest that offenders experience intrusive memories about 
their crimes, it appears that many offenders in this study did not initially seem to be aware of this 
reality (i.e., the difference noted between their initial self-reports of unwanted distressing 
memories during the instructions portion of the study compared to their responses and related 
scores on the actual measures of intrusive memories).  This lack of awareness and lack of insight 
may be related to the amount of shame related to intrusive memories, and the avoidant strategies 
used to cope with the shame and memories (Chung et al., 2016; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Gray et 
al., 2003; Horowitz, 1976; Litz et al., 2009; Rauch & Foa, 2006).   
4.2 Offence-Related Shame 
As expected, shame was found to contribute the most unique variance in the prediction of 
intrusive memories, and had greater point precision in prediction, over and above guilt and the 
other factors in this study.  Shame also contributed the most unique variance in avoidance 
symptoms.  Taken together, these findings are consistent with the larger PTSD literature (Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 1976; Rauch & Foa, 2006), as well as perpetrator-induced trauma and 
moral injury research in veteran populations (Chung et al., 2016; Gray et al., 2003; Litz et al., 
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2009).  Past studies had failed to examine shame and recommended that it be explored.  The 
current findings, therefore, fill this gap in the literature, and importantly contribute to our 
understanding of trauma symptomology, such as intrusive memories, in an adult offender 
population.  The negative self-evaluation involved in shame (e.g., being a bad person), and its 
related pathogenic and destructive nature, is likely what makes shame stand out compared to 
guilt, which just accounts for the actions (e.g., doing a bad thing).  In practice, offenders may 
report guilt and may have a sense that showing remorse for their actions is an appropriate 
behavior or feeling to display.  Shame, however, may not be something often openly disclosed or 
expressed by offenders.  Rather anger or sadness may be the most obvious feelings (e.g., 
observable through institutional/community violence or withdrawal), and shame may be the 
vulnerable underlying state that is being avoided and expressed through these other means.  
Violence prevention programs work to teach offenders how to manage anger and other emotions; 
however, the programs do not often ask about shame, and it is perhaps unlikely that offenders 
will be spontaneously upfront about feelings of shame.  This hesitation may be partly due to 
offenders being unaware of their underlying [suppressed] feelings, or perhaps due to the stigma 
they fear by admitting shame.   
Longitudinal research had suggested that male offenders who are prone to shame may be 
at an increased risk for recidivism, whereas those prone to guilt are at decreased risk (Hosser et 
al., 2008).  Although recidivism was beyond the scope of the current study, risk for violence was 
examined in the context of institutional violence.  The relationship between shame and 
institutional violence was not significant.  This result may be because there is no relationship, or 
perhaps it may be due to the more controlled institutional setting, the restricted timeframe 
assessed (i.e., during current institutionalization), or limitations of self-report (i.e., withheld 
disclosure of incidents).  Psychopathy, on the other hand, was related to both institutional 
violence and to lower levels of offence-related guilt, which is consistent with the proposition 
made by Hosser and colleagues above.  Although those higher in psychopathy reported less guilt 
regarding their offence than those lower in psychopathy, they did not report significantly less 
shame (and interestingly reported more negative cognitions about themselves).  This might 
explain why findings did not support the idea that psychopathy would potentially serve as a 
protective factor for intrusive memories.  Specifically, individuals higher in psychopathy still 
seemed to experience shame regarding their offence (which is a key factor related to intrusive 
memories), and are therefore not ‘immune’ to intrusive memories as was previously expected.  
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Although psychopathy is defined by characteristics that suggest these individuals do not care 
about others (e.g., glibness, lack of empathy, lack of remorse, manipulation, and antisocial 
traits), it does not mean that their actions do not make them feel bad about themselves (or 
perhaps the current participants exaggerated their experience of shame and negative cognitions 
of themselves as would be perhaps expected of them by social convention).  If in fact negative 
self-evaluation is apparent in offenders with psychopathy, then this can serve to somewhat 
humanize how they are perceived, and may speak further to the rehabilitation potential for these 
individuals.   
In correctional settings, the discussion and treatment of shame seems to be reserved 
primarily for sex offenders, and for female offenders who have suffered trauma.  Therefore, the 
identified prevalence of intrusive memories and offence-related shame in this male population 
sheds light on the need for further attention when it comes to incorporating or addressing it in the 
context of responsivity for case management, programming modalities, and/or treatment of this 
population.  Whether or not we should target offence-related intrusive memories and shame 
directly remains a clinical and empirical question.  It may be practical and safe for offenders to 
remain hardened and maintain avoidant coping strategies in order to survive the harsh 
correctional environment (although it may then come at the cost of limited rehabilitation).  
Alternatively, given that shame is the more painful self-evaluative emotion linked to hiding or 
escaping, whereas guilt is more focused on the behavior and is linked to making amends 
(Tangney, Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011), treatment interventions may seek to transform maladaptive 
feelings of shame into more functional feelings of guilt.  If supports are available to promote the 
management of the difficult emotions related to intrusive memories in the structured 
environment of jail, then it may be one of the most ideal places for these individuals to work 
through their memories and related feelings.  In either case, it is important for those working 
with offenders to be at least aware of the potential for offenders to experience intrusive 
memories and shame related to their crimes, and keep that in mind when interacting with them, 
and when developing conceptualizations of them and their behaviors.  
Intrusive memories and shame can both be distressing by their very nature, however, 
consistent with previous research (Jaffe et al., 2015; Musker, 2013), no apparent increase in 
trauma or distress was observed or reported due to participation.  Instead, reviewing some of the 
commentary made by participants during participation and feedback, further suggests that shame 
and intrusive memories about offending is an area that offenders would benefit from exploring.  
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For example, a number of participants reported that although they had some difficulty thinking 
about things that they have tried to push down, it ended up being good to think about it.  Some 
were even relieved to have the opportunity to share and talk about their experiences.  For a 
number of them, it was the first time they had talked about the particular offence since it 
happened because of shame and a lack of opportunity.  Other comments were related to the 
offenders’ appreciation that I, as a researcher, cared about the impact that the crime had on them.  
These comments suggest that providing opportunities for discussion and reflection, and that 
framing questions around the topic of offence-related symptoms or impact, may in itself serve to 
reduce avoidance and shame in this population.  Addressing these symptoms as relevant 
responsivity factors may serve therefore to enhance rapport with these individuals, and bolster 
their motivation for change. 
4.3 Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence 
It was expected that an offender’s emotional response to his crime, and his related 
experience of intrusive memories, was likely linked to the distinctiveness and emotionality of the 
act itself.  This speaks to the reactivity-instrumentality of the crime that occurred.  Emotions 
typically discussed in the context of reactive violence have more commonly included anger, and 
impulsive outbursts of anger, during the commission of the crime (Cornell et al., 1996), and less 
commonly considered are the dysphoric emotions present (e.g., frustration, sadness, 
helplessness).  It was thought to be important and worthwhile to include these kinds of dysphoric 
emotions in the I-ROQ measure in order to examine the full range of possible emotions felt at the 
time of the offence, especially since anger is often the overtly visible expression of more 
prominent underlying dysphoric emotions (Teyber & McClure, 2011).  In the present study, 
results indicated that crimes that were more reactive in nature, and that specifically involved 
dysphoric emotions felt at the time, were related to both higher levels of offence-related shame 
and the presence of intrusive memories.  It was expected that anger also would be related to 
intrusive memories, however, the absence of this finding may provide further support for the 
relevance of underlying dysphoric emotional components that are distinct to an individual, above 
and beyond anger.   
The results also indicated that the more reactive the crime, the more shame experienced, 
and the combined effect of both these factors was related to the presence of intrusive memories.  
This partially mediating role of shame on the relationship between the reactivity of offence and 
intrusive memories may speak to the emotional needs of these offenders.  Specifically, recent 
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research has identified different treatment needs for offenders based on the instrumentality-
reactivity of the offence (Derkzen & Serin, 2015).  Derkzen and Serin suggest that offenders who 
commit reactive violence seem to have greater needs in emotional and interpersonal areas, 
whereas offenders who commit instrumental violence have greater needs in the areas of criminal 
associates and attitudes.  Putting this perspective into the context of the current study, it may be 
that shame is one of the emotion-relevant treatment needs for offenders who committed more 
reactive forms of crime.   
In terms of the relationship between crime type and psychopathy, it was expected that 
crimes that were more instrumental in nature would be related to higher psychopathy scores.  
This hypothesis was not supported when examining the reactivity-instrumentality continuum; 
however, looking at the group of individual factors, results suggested that feelings of anger 
during the offence, as well as more planning and control of the offence, were related to higher 
psychopathy scores.  Past research has argued that a reactive-instrumental dichotomy does not 
account for the complexity of crimes, specifically in terms of information and emotion 
processing (Bushman & Anderson, 2001) and with crimes that involve both instrumental and 
reactive components (Cooper & Yuille, 2007; Cornell et al., 1996).  The presence of both anger 
and planning in the current findings is consistent with Blais and colleagues’ (2014) suggestion 
that psychopathy is equally related to both instrumental and reactive crime.  Therefore, 
individuals who are high in psychopathy may have needs in emotional and interpersonal areas, as 
well as in the areas of criminal associates and attitudes.  It would be interesting for future 
qualitative researchers to explore whether individuals higher in psychopathy are more likely to 
express anger rather than dysphoric emotions (due to criminal attitudes and ‘appropriate’ feelings 
to express) and how this experience relates to the type of crime committed and the impact the 
event has on them.  Findings from the current study may provide a deeper understanding of those 
factors involved in, and resulting from, different types of crime (i.e., shame, intrusive memories, 
psychopathy) and could subsequently further inform treatment planning and rehabilitation targets 
for offenders. 
4.4 Additional Considerations  
The various factors assessed in the current study, including shame, guilt, stress ratings, 
and reactivity of the crime, together accounted for 43% of the variance in intrusive memories, 
and offered a 65% success of predicting the presence of intrusive memories in this sample.  
Although these rates are noteworthy and support the hypotheses made in terms of the role that 
77 
 
these emotions and reactions to committing offences play in the development of intrusive 
memories, they also suggest that there are other factors at play.  Past research has identified that 
individual factors (e.g., IQ, personality, defence styles), social factors (e.g., family and 
community function/support, stress related to losses, roles and relationships), biological factors 
(e.g., amygdala and hippocampal processes), and historical factors (e.g., childhood trauma or 
past victimization) play a role in the development of trauma symptoms (see Andrews et al., 
2003; Bisson, 2009; Brewin & Soni, 2011; Briere, et al., 2016; Buckley et al., 2000; Chung et al., 
2016).  Exploring these additional sources of individual differences was beyond the scope of the 
current study, and should be given some consideration when interpreting the study findings.    
4.4.1 Complex Trauma 
Although efforts were made to account for the complexity of trauma, due the limitations 
previously noted regarding the reliability and interpretation of the TSC measure with this sample, 
the results reported were without the inclusion of this control.  That being said, the findings 
discussed above should be considered in the greater context of trauma, and with the ‘messiness’ 
of trauma in mind.  Some of the issues regarding the reliability of the TSC measure may speak to 
the possible traumatic nature of being incarcerated.  Specifically, many participants based their 
TSC responses on the jail context – and endorsed items typically reported by victims of sexual 
assault.  For example, participants reported poor sleep, loneliness, fear of men, not feeling 
satisfied with their sex life, unnecessary or over-frequent washing, trouble getting along with 
others, waking up in the middle of the night, feeling tense all the time, trouble controlling their 
anger, desire to physically hurt others, and feelings of inferiority. Therefore, by virtue of the 
living conditions of correctional facilities and the risk of violence by other inmates, the prison 
environment may be traumatic itself (Edgar, O’Donnell, & Martin, 2011), and this experience 
may have exacerbated trauma symptom ratings in the current study.  This possibility further 
compounds the complexity and cumulative effect of trauma when already considering whatever 
previous victimization or offence-related trauma that offenders may have also experienced.   
Given the complexity and additive effects of trauma on an individual, Briere and colleagues 
(2016) suggest that trauma treatment or prevention of trauma in such environments may 
minimize some of the additional suffering associated with being incarcerated.  This idea of 
minimizing suffering, however, speaks to larger considerations in terms of the administrative 
organization of correctional facilities, the resources available, the condition of the buildings, the 
training of the staff, and the political slant/priority (i.e., rehabilitation vs. punishment) espoused. 
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In addition, it is important to consider that previous trauma histories were not assessed in 
the current study.  This omission is noteworthy given that offender populations tend to have high 
rates of past victimization (Ardino et al., 2013; Wolff & Shi, 2012) and that these kinds of 
historical factors are related to the development of current trauma symptomology (Briere et al., 
2016).  Multiple traumas also have been found to be significantly associated with the seriousness 
of offence committed in female samples (Karatzias et al., 2017).  This latter point speaks to the 
relevance of trauma and shame in the treatment and rehabilitation of male and female offender 
populations.  Shame has been found to be a common consequence of complex trauma (Courtois, 
2004).  Without previous trauma history and without knowledge of shame related to this history, 
it can be difficult to parse apart the specific source of the shame assessed in the current study.  
Even though we assessed shame related to a specific crime (and participants were instructed to 
respond to offence-related shame), it is possible, and likely, that this is confounded and made 
more complex by past offences and victimization.  
4.4.1.1 Cultural considerations and complex trauma.  There are cultural 
considerations that also need to be discussed when interpreting the current findings in the context 
of complex trauma.  Nearly 60% of the study sample self-identified as Indigenous.  Indigenous 
populations are not only over-represented in the Canadian correctional system (and likely have 
experienced multiple incarcerations), but they have also historically experienced decades of 
trans-generational trauma (re: colonization, and residential schools – producing a loss of roles, 
identity, and culture; broken communities and relationships; family dysfunction; and substance 
use; Kirmayer, Brass, & Tait, 2000) ).   
 These historical, cultural, and social factors compound the cumulative effect of trauma 
even further for Indigenous persons in the correctional system.  These histories are important to 
consider in terms of diagnosis and treatment approaches, and we must ask whether it is 
appropriate or relevant to use Western symptom labels (e.g., intrusive memories) to describe 
their experiences that are deeply affected by colonization (Kirmayer et al., 2000) .  For example, 
it may be expected that due to their traumatic history, Indigenous participants would be more 
likely to experience intrusive memories related to their offence.  In the current study, however, 
there were fewer Indigenous participants who reported intrusive memories compared to 
Caucasian participants (44% and 51%, respectively).  It may be that Indigenous peoples are less 
likely to interpret the memories as distressing, or it may be that they are not traumatic relative to 
other aspects of their lives.  Regardless, we were not in a position to begin exploring “racial” 
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differences in intrusive memories in the current study as “race” in this instance would only serve 
as proxy for the effects of colonization and complex trauma (i.e., multifaceted cultural 
considerations) and this was deemed not to be appropriate.  Attempts were made to conduct a 
culturally sensitive research study by piloting the study items and gathering feedback from 
Indigenous participants.  Although the questionnaire items were not identified as problematic, 
the general methodology may not have been ideal for members of Indigenous cultures (Kovach, 
2015; Moeke-Pickering et al., 2006).  Specifically, storytelling is culturally important to this 
population. A more qualitative study that incorporated their stories may provide us with a more 
culturally relevant understanding of their offence-related memories and feelings, and how this 
understanding may relate to their trauma histories (Michell, 1999).  Further, putting participants’ 
feelings, memories, or stories in the context of the medicine wheel may be a good example of 
how to make future studies more culturally appropriate (Moeke-Pickering et al., 2006) and to 
provide a better understanding of how ‘trauma’ is perceived.  For some cultures, the medicine 
wheel model connects people to the earth and with the four directions. The idea of the four 
directions could be used as a way of organizing data, narratives, and storytelling (Moeke-
Pickering et al., 2006).  Participants were not given anything in return for their participation. 
This was largely due to institutional considerations (e.g., perceived “coercion,” and concerns 
around contraband items).  That being said, given the importance of reciprocity in Indigenous 
cultures (Michell, 1999), it is recommended that researchers, institutions, and ethics review 
boards, find a suitable way to honor this custom (e.g., offering tobacco) in future work, 
particularly if researchers are collecting stories on sensitive topics, such as trauma, through 
qualitative approaches.   
4.4.2  Substance Use   
When discussing intrusive memories, emotionality, and coping, the role of substance use 
also should be considered.  The rates of substance use disorders among offender populations are 
high (Beaudette et al., 2015), and substance use is important to consider both in terms of the 
offender’s mental and emotional state at the time of the crime, and in terms of its role in 
avoidance or suppression coping strategies.  A quarter of the current sample reported being under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the offence, and this rate was even higher when 
examining the crimes ‘causing’ intrusive memories.  Some participants reported having “blanks” 
in their memories of the event because of substances, and had pieced together the full version of 
the event from what the police had said, or what occurred in court.  Those under the influence of 
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drugs or alcohol at the time of the crime reported less planning, a lack of control, and the absence 
of goals during their offence.  This experience speaks to the impulsivity, unpredictability, and 
disinhibition related to using substances, which is relevant in terms of committing crimes that are 
seemingly more reactive in nature.  Committing crimes under the influence may not be 
consistent with how individuals view themselves or their world.  This may create cognitive 
dissonance and subsequently produces shame (Festinger, 1957).   
In addition to substance use creating shame, substance use also has been used a means of 
coping with shame (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Tangney et al., 2011; Tangney, 
Stuewig, Mashek, & Hastings, 2011).  Specifically, due to its pathogenic effects, shame drives 
people to want to escape or hide, and this escape is often found in substances.  Indeed, 
substances are often used to regulate intense trauma-related shame (Holl et al., 2017) and other 
PTSD symptoms (Ullman, Relyea, Peter-Hagene, & Vasquez, 2013).  In a study examining 
female offenders (Kreis, Gillings, Svanberg, & Schwannauer, 2016), shame appeared to both 
precede and be a consequence of substance abuse, and was found to be central to ongoing 
negative interpersonal experiences, addictions, and offending pathways.  Although intrusive 
memories and shame may not be risk factors per se, substance abuse has been identified as a 
treatable dynamic risk factor for recidivism; as such it is a targeted criminogenic need when 
working with offenders in correctional and community settings (Bonta & Andrews, 2007).  
Given that many individuals use substances to cope with or avoid the aforementioned feelings 
and experiences, intrusive memories and shame therefore may be seen as precipitating factors to 
other known risks/needs, and also may be seen as internal responsivity factors that may be worth 
considering in case management. 
4.5 Theoretical Implications 
Many theoretical foundations of PTSD have been based on victims and veterans, and the 
development of fear structures and fear responses from witnessing or experiencing threats – 
violence or trauma (Ehlers et al., 2002; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Horowitz, 
1976; Lang, 1977).  This same literature had placed trauma symptoms in terms of the special 
mechanism view (i.e., dual systems, poor integration, processing failure, and compromised 
encoding).  The literature has since expanded to consider perpetrator-induced trauma (MacNair, 
2015), and also has begun to consider the dimensionality approach to trauma and the 
characteristics of complex trauma (Briere et al., 2016).  Given that fear or violence were not 
necessarily present in the crimes reported by the current sample, the recurrent and distressing 
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nature of some these offence-related memories may not best be explained by fear or poor 
integration, but instead explained as a consequence of the enhanced accessibility of these events 
in the offenders’ autobiographical memory (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008).  Specifically, the schema-
deviance and the distinctiveness of the offence, combined with the emotional enhancement 
involved, are central to development of intrusive memories of these events.  This is consistent 
with the basic mechanism view of understanding intrusive memories in terms of associative 
recall, and as extreme subclasses of involuntary memories (Berntsen, 1996, 2009; Kvavilashvili, 
2014).  Regardless of which view is taken regarding trauma memories (special or basic 
mechanism), addressing aversive emotions like anger and shame through cognitive techniques 
and restructuring will likely result in better outcomes (Foa, Riggs, Massie, & Yarczower, 1995).  
These outcomes may include reduced avoidance, as well as readiness for further treatment (i.e., 
addressing intrusive memories), improvement in overall institutional behavior, and a reduction in 
engaging in risk-related behaviors (e.g., substance use and aggression).   
4.6 Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current study is not without its limitations, and these should be kept in mind when 
interpreting these findings. These limitations relate to the methodology, the sample, and the data 
itself.  These are discussed in turn below, with considerations and suggestions explored for future 
research. 
4.6.1 Methodological Limitations 
Data were collected from offender self-reports, without corroboration of file information.  
This omission is a limiting factor, partly because this population does not have a reputation of 
honesty and of being forthcoming, and it is possible that their responses were not truthful.  It was 
for that reason that rapport building was of increased importance to the researcher.  Efforts were 
made by the researcher to engage participants, and to make this engagement collaborative and 
voluntary.  Participants were not pressured or made to feel like they were mandated to participant 
given their custody status.  Participants were given space to share their thoughts throughout and 
elaborate if they wanted to without being restricted by the questionnaire format.  It is hoped that 
rapport provided a context for the provision of honest reports of emotions and memory 
characteristics.  If any malingering was to have occurred, it is anticipated to have been more 
likely for responses related to institutional violence and psychopathy.  It is uncertain whether 
counts of institutional violence in the current study were accurate as a result of offenders’ 
willingness to disclose fights, or minimized due to offenders’ hesitation to report this type of 
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information (especially if there were not caught or charged for it).  In addition, there may be 
concerns that a self-report measure of psychopathy may not be a valid indicator of psychopathic 
traits due to the core features involved in psychopathy (e.g., lying, deception, manipulation).  A 
recent meta analysis examining other self-report measures of psychopathy (Ray et al., 2013), 
however, has provided support for the validity of these measures, and alleviates some concerns 
regarding positive response bias for items related to psychopathy.  For the most part, it felt like 
the answers provided in the current study were authentic, and the researcher used clinical 
judgement when it felt sensible to clarify question items or reiterate the response provided in 
order to ensure its accuracy.  Future research could attempt to access institution file information 
(i.e., criminal history, police report of offence event, victim statements, incidents of institutional 
violence, file-rated psychopathy) to ensure the reliability of the responses provided, and also 
allow researchers to gather additional information (e.g., treatment/program engagement).   
The interpretation of the current results also may be limited by the measures used.  For 
example, the measure of event stress was a single-item scale.  While this was appealing to use 
because it is short, the cost is that its psychometric properties are unknown and it may have 
limited reliability (Furr, 2011).  In addition, a number of the measures used (e.g., for 
posttraumatic cognitions, intrusion and avoidance symptoms, trauma-related shame) were 
primarily developed/used with samples who were victims of trauma (as opposed to perpetrator-
induced trauma).  To address this limitation, the measures were adapted for this study with the 
focus of the questioning being on the offence, which is a strategy adopted in some past trauma 
offender research (e.g., Gray et al., 2003; Welfare & Hollin, 2015).  Although future offender 
research may benefit from offender-specific measures/tools on perpetrator-induced trauma and 
related emotions, the similarity between the current findings and those found in the general 
PTSD literature (i.e., regarding the role of shame, emotionality of events, and avoidance), as well 
as the strong Cronbach alphas for inter-item consistency, speaks to the relative adequacy of these 
adaptations for the current study.  Replication studies may help to further elucidate these 
potential measurement limitations.  In addition, there were some differences in results obtained 
by the dichotomous and continuous measure of intrusive memories (i.e., findings on institutional 
violence, anger during the offence, and lack of planned control during the offence), whereby the 
continuous measure picked up on significant differences while the dichotomous measure did not 
in these instances. While both measures were highly correlated, these disparate results may speak 
to the enhanced variability when using continuous measures (i.e., making it a more sensitive 
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measure).  Finally, findings related to the instrumentality-reactivity of the offence may also have 
been limited by the continuous nature of IRO-Q.  While the total score was purposely included to 
capture the continuum of crime types, it may be more accurate to consider the duality of the 
construct.  Specifically, instead of assessing crimes on a continuum, future research may wish to 
consider using separate metrics – separating instrumentality from reactivity and measuring 
crimes on both independently (i.e., offences could be high on both, low on both, or high on one 
versus the other). 
4.6.2 Sample Limitations  
The present findings may be limited by the size of the sample.  Although the current 
sample allowed for the examination of intrusive memories in this population, we were unable to 
conduct more advanced analyses (e.g., structural equation modelling) which may have provided 
a more in depth understanding of the causal paths/relationships between these variables of 
interest.  Gaining access to offenders was challenging in itself, and collecting data from over 100 
offenders in person was not a small task; however, if possible, future research should aim for a 
larger sample (i.e., 200+) in order to have the flexibility to further explore the factors involved in 
the development and maintenance of offence-related intrusive memories.   
The findings also may be limited by the specific population accessed (provincial vs 
federal; sentenced vs. remanded), and the types of offences committed by this population.  
Offenders are provincially sentenced for crimes with sentences that are ‘2-years less a day,’ 
whereas federal sentences are ordered for crimes with higher sentences (2+ years).  In other 
words, federal offences tend to be more severe and serious in nature.  Some of the offenders in 
the current sample had previously served federal sentences for past crimes, and some chose to 
focus on these crimes for the purpose of the study.  The current study therefore involved 
offenders who committed violent and non-violent offences. The prevalence rates of intrusive 
memories in this sample was similar to past literature examining offence-related PTSD and 
intrusive memories in forensic psychiatric and/or violent offender populations (Chung et al., 
2016; Evans et al., 2007b; Gray et al., 2003; Musker, 2013; Pollock, 1999; Welfare & Hollin, 
2015) ).  Given the context of these other populations (i.e., not having capacity to know actions 
were wrong due to mental illness, and the extent of violence involved, respectively), it may not 
be surprising that these individuals were impacted by the event in those samples.  However, the 
similar findings in the current study of provincially sentenced offenders offer support that further 
enhances the generalizability of the past findings.  Although a federal sample would have 
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consisted of offenders who committed more serious offences, we expect that similar results 
would be found in that population.  Replication of the current findings in a federal population 
would be worthwhile. 
This current study only included sentenced offenders, and not remanded populations.  
Remanded offenders are those who are in custody but with their charges still pending (i.e., in 
custody awaiting a court ruling regarding their guilt).  Given the ongoing legal involvement of 
these individuals, excluding them was a limitation placed on the current study by the Ministry, in 
order to limit the potential and foreseeable legal issues or complications that may come up 
through participation.  It is anticipated that remanded offenders would report similar emotions 
and symptoms related to their crimes; however, the current findings cannot be generalized to 
remand populations at this time.  If future researchers were to examine intrusive memories in 
remanded populations, it should be noted that the veracity of their reports may be less reliable 
given their potential “not guilty” pleas.  
The current study only consisted of male participants, which may be a limiting factor 
when looking to generalize the findings to female offenders.  Although the focus on male 
offenders was in part due to ease of access (i.e., larger male offender pool), it also was in an 
effort to place the current study in the context of existing findings.  Specifically, the existing 
research on offence-related trauma had examined these data in predominantly male samples, and 
the current study sought to address those gaps identified in this previous literature by using a 
mixed violent/non-violent offender sample, and by examining the relationship between shame 
and reactivity of crime.  It could be speculated that similar results would be found in a female 
sample; however, this hypothesis would need to be specifically explored.  Research has 
identified that female offenders tend to present with higher rates of PTSD and have more 
complex histories of lifetime trauma (Komarovskaya, Loper, Warren, & Jackson, 2011; Kubiak, 
2004).  Female offenders have also reported higher rates of interpersonal trauma, whereas male 
offenders have reported higher rates of witnessing harm or violence (Komarovskaya et al., 2011).  
These kinds of differences are noteworthy, and the role of complex trauma may play an even 
bigger part in the experiences of female offenders.  Females who have experienced multiple 
traumatic events may be more likely to commit serious offences (Karatzias et al., 2017); 
therefore, it is critical for future researchers to also explore the factors involved in offence-




4.6.3 Limitations with Data   
The current findings also may be limited in terms of content of the data collected.  
Although participants provided responses to over 200 questions covering a range of pertinent 
topics, there are other areas that were not explored or details that could not be extracted.  For 
example, past trauma histories and past criminal histories were not assessed.  Some participants 
had commented that they wished that I considered their history and hardships.  Others wished 
that I asked about their motivations to commit the crime (i.e., why they ended up doing what 
they did, what led up to it – for example broke/nothing to lose, grief, substance use), or that I 
should also have asked about the impact or consequences of the crime (e.g., losing their drivers 
licence, job, etc.).  A qualitative approach may have facilitated these kinds of questions and 
discussions, and also may have provided a rich and full narrative of the content of intrusive 
memories and details pertaining to the shame experienced.  By addressing some of these 
questions, we may have been able to make connections regarding the role of 
motivations/consequences on factors such as anger, shame, sense of injustice, antisocial 
attitudes, and intrusive memories.  This information could shed light on how offenders view 
themselves, their autonomy, their future, and how that might influence their participation in 
treatment.  
Qualitative analyses may also serve as a more reliable source for coding the recall 
perspective taken for these memories.  In the current study, participants reported how they saw 
themselves in the memories (field, observer, or mixed).  There were more reports of the field 
perspective among those participants without intrusive memories, whereas there were more 
reports of a mix of field/observer in those with intrusive memories.  Coding the perspective 
through their narratives would not only substantiate these findings, but would also allow for 
further exploration into the role of shame, emotionality of the event, and avoidance on recall 
perspective for intrusive memories.  Future researchers should consider expanding on the current 
study using qualitative means, as this would be relevant both in terms of enhancing our 
understanding of the factors involved in offence-related intrusive memories, and in terms of the 
inclusion of culturally important aspects (e.g., Indigenous stories, as previously noted).   
Lastly, the current study involved a design that relied solely on self-reports.  As a result, 
this study did not assess follow-up symptoms, recidivism, or treatment engagement.  Trauma 
symptoms have been previously identified as a potential barrier in correctional treatment 
programs (Martin et al., 2014).  It would therefore be worthwhile for future researchers to assess 
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the effects of offence-related trauma and shame on treatment engagement and on participation in 
correctional programs.  To gain a better understanding of the implication of this research, it 
would also be interesting to conduct a pre-post study that 1) measured offence-related shame and 
intrusive memories, 2) implemented an intervention to reduce shame, and then 3) re-tested the 
symptoms post-intervention.  Trauma symptomology and shame have been linked to recidivism 
in past studies (Hosser et al., 2008; Kubiak, 2004), however, to our knowledge this has not yet 
been examined in terms of offence-related trauma.  Future studies could extend this work and 
follow offenders into the community to assess recidivism, and the long-term effects of offence-
related trauma symptoms and shame.   
4.7 Conclusion  
Offenders experience intrusive memories about the offences they commit.  When 
offending behaviors conflict with the individuals’ moral beliefs and their expectations about 
themselves, this may create shame, and may enhance the negative impacts of the crime.  Given 
that offenders are not often asked about their crimes, beyond the context of court pleas, risk 
assessment, or violence prevention programming, it is possible that there are a number of 
individuals in correctional settings suffering from trauma related to their own offence and who 
have not yet been identified by clinical services (Welfare & Hollin, 2015).  We may be doing a 
disservice to offenders and the larger public community if we fail to conceptualize and address 
the potential psychological, behavioral, and interpersonal impacts of perpetrating offences.  
There are clinical implications of this research in terms of assessing and treating this population.  
Specifically, if questions regarding experiencing symptoms related to the crime, or other 
traumas, are not asked, and these symptoms are not assessed/addressed, then we may not see a 
reduction in symptoms or an improvement in behavior because we are not targeting the right 
trauma/symptom.  Intake assessments for trauma symptomology (crime-related or from other 
traumas) may be fruitful (e.g., quick screening to flag for follow-up).  This, however, speaks to a 
larger issue of resources and funding needed to supply mental health support.  It also brings up 
whether jail is used for rehabilitation or punishment (and whether there is political and public 
support for offender mental health).  
In conclusion, both intrusive memories and shame are areas of offender mental health 
that receive little attention in current offender management.  They are responsivity factors that 
could interfere with programming and rehabilitation efforts (e.g., affecting rapport, coping 
abilities, and motivation and engagement levels,).  Intrusive memories and shame are also 
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relevant to keep in mind for risk management, specifically these symptoms may be precipitating 
factors for related risk factors (i.e., substance abuse, aggression), and should be considered when 
evaluating patterns of violence, and creating relapse prevention plans, both in the institution and 
in the community (Hosser et al., 2008; Kubiak, 2004).  The current study has filled some gaps 
identified in past research and in doing so has enhanced our understanding of what is involved in 
adult offenders’ intrusive memories.  As such, emotions such as shame may be worthwhile to 
target to enhance the wellbeing of offenders, and to inform offender management plans for the 
provision of mental health services.  Addressing intrusive memories has implications beyond 
helping abate offenders’ symptoms.  Taken together, the larger implications of this study may 
also relate to the protection of correctional staff by institutional violence, and for overall public 
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PhD RESEARCH STUDENT COMING TO DISCUSS 
YOUR THOUGHTS & FEELINGS ABOUT YOUR 
CRIME 
 
Study is looking to see if offenders experience unwanted and 
stressful thoughts about their crime.   
 
Confidentiality: Your information will be kept private.   
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. 
Whether you choose to participate or not will not affect your 





IF INTERESTED PLEASE LET AN INSTITUTION 
STAFF MEMBER KNOW! 
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Saskatchewan Ethics Committee for Behavioral 
Research (#15-300), and the Saskatchewan Ministry of Justice – Corrections & Policing. 
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Appendix C: Consent Form 
 
 Participant Consent Form 
 
 
Project Title:  Offender Thoughts of Their Crimes: Exploring the Factors Involved in the 
Experience of Persistent and Unwanted Thoughts 
 
Researchers: This study is being done by Annik Mossiere (annik.mossiere@usask.ca, a PhD 
student in clinical psychology at the University of Saskatchewan under the supervision of Dr. 
Tammy Marche (tmarche@stmcollege.ca; 306-966-8076), department of psychology (St. Thomas 
More College, U of S).  
 
Purpose: The researchers are looking at offender thoughts about their crimes.  We want to find 
out if offenders experience persistent and unwanted thoughts (also known as intrusive memories) 
about their crimes. We also want to see if there is any connection between violent crimes, how 
offenders feel about the crime, and how this affects their thoughts.     
 
Procedures: If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a number of 
paper and pencil questionnaires. They include questions about your thoughts about a crime that 
you identify (e.g., your experience, your emotions, your beliefs, etc. – see sample questions 
below). You’ll also be asked to provide basic information, such as you age, race, education level, 
index offence, mental health diagnoses, and institutional violence). These questionnaires will take 
about 40 to 60 minutes to finish.  You will fill out the questionnaires privately in a room in the 
institution with the researcher or a research assistant. You’ll also be given a chance at the beginning 
and end of the study to share your thoughts on any aspect of the study, the forms, and the questions. 
This may be used to help us understand our findings, or to find you extra support if needed. 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can choose not to answer any 
particular question, and if you don’t understand any question you can ask about it at the 
time.  You may stop participating in the research project for any reason, at any time, without 
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telling the researcher the reasons why or getting any penalty.  Whether you choose to 
participate or not will not affect your sentence or your clinical treatment.   
Sample questions:  
 
• I had dreams about it 
0 








• I stayed away from reminders of it 
0 








• If others knew what happened to me, they would not like me 
0 
Not true of me 
1 
Somewhat true of me 
2 
Mostly true of me 
3 
Completely true of me 
 

























Please feel free to ask any questions about the procedures and/or goals of the study. 
 
Funded by: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Centre for 
Forensic Behavioural Science and Justice Studies. 
 
Potential Risks & Benefits:  Persistent and unwanted thoughts are upsetting to people who have 
them. We don’t expect that participation in this study will cause you any further stress or suffering 
beyond what you might already be going through. Although completing questionnaires can create 
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some stress, most people participating in research studies that ask about unwanted thoughts find it 
to be a positive experience actually, and they typically don’t regret participating.  
 
If you begin to feel upset or stressed, we’ll let the on-shift correctional officer and an appropriate 
member of your case management team know. By participating in this study, you might find some 
benefit in getting the chance to think about things you might not ordinarily be able to. And if you 
do get upset while participating in this study, you would get the chance to seek the appropriate 
help you need upon your release to the community (e.g., psychologist, elder). You will not be paid 
to participate. 
 
Confidentiality: Your information will be kept private.  Your name will not be on the 
questionnaires or on the notes taken by the researcher.  The Consent Forms will be kept separately 
from the questionnaires, so it will not be possible to connect your name with your answers.  Your 
responses will be grouped together with other people’s responses, and all personal information 
will be removed.  
 
Correctional staff may know that you are participating in this study, however, your participation 
and responses will not influence your care or sentence time, and the institution staff will not be 
informed of your responses to the study. Please do not disclose any criminal activity that has not 
already been disclosed elsewhere, as the researcher may have a duty to report it. 
 
The results of this research will be used in the student-researcher’s PhD and may be presented at 
conferences and published in journals.  The information we collect will be securely stored by the 
researcher for a minimum of five years after results have been published.  When the data are no 
longer required, it will be destroyed. 
 
Right to Withdraw: If you wish to stop participating, any questionnaires that you have finished 
will be automatically destroyed.  Your right to stop and remove your data from the study will apply 




Follow up: To get a summary of the results from this study, please contact the researcher, Annik 
Mossiere, or the Principal Investigator, Dr. Tammy Marche, using the information at the top of 
page 1.  Results will be available once the study is completed (Spring 2018). 
 
Questions or Concerns:  If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study or your rights 
as a participant, please feel free to contact the researchers using the information at the top of page 
1.  This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 




Statement of Disclosure: You understand that the information you provide is confidential, and 
will never be revealed to anyone except under the following circumstances: If you disclose 
information about plans to harm yourself or others, information concerning any unknown 
emotional, physical or sexual abuse of children, or information about any other criminal activities 




    
Name of Participant  Signature  Date 
 
Consent:  Your signature below means that you agree to participate in this study, and that you 
have been provided with enough information to make that decision.  It also means that you have 
read and understood the research study described above, and you have had a chance to have your 
questions answered. 
     
 
 
Name of Participant  Signature  Date 
 
______________________________      _______________________ 









   
Project Title:  Offender Thoughts of Their Crimes: Exploring the Factors Involved in the 
Experience of Persistent and Unwanted Thoughts 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. This form explains the purpose of our study and why we 
are interested in this issue. 
 
The purpose of this research was to gain a better understanding of offenders’ thoughts of their 
crimes.  We were specifically interested in persistent and unwanted thoughts (also known as 
intrusive memories). In the questionnaire package, we asked you a number of questions about how 
you felt, and what you remember about a specific event.  We were interested in examining how 
emotions like shame could affect thoughts.  We were also interested to see if the type of violence 
committed (impulsive and emotional vs. planned and with a goal in mind) influence whether these 
types of thoughts occur.  
 
We expect that a large number of offenders experience persistent and unwanted thoughts.  We 
predict that those who committed an emotional and impulsive crime, and who feel shame from it, 
will be more likely to experience persistent and unwanted thoughts about the event. We expect 
that offenders who are high in psychopathic traits will be less likely to experience persistent and 
unwanted thoughts.  We also predict that offenders who experience these types of thoughts may 
be more likely to get violent within the institution and have difficulty making progress in their 
correctional treatment programs. 
 
We hope that by increasing our understanding of persistent and unwanted thoughts in offenders, 
we will be better able to identify them and address them, which is important for both offender 
rehabilitation, as well as offender and staff safety in the institution.  
 
To learn more you can contact the researchers involved in this study: 




• Dr. Tammy Marche (tmarche@stmcollege.ca; 306-966-8076), Department of Psychology, St. 
Thomas More College.  
• Annik Mossiere (annik.mossiere@usask.ca), Department of Psychology, University of 
Saskatchewan 
 
Should you have any ethical concerns, please contact: 
• Behavioural Research Ethics Office, University of Saskatchewan, 306-966-2975 or toll free 1-
888-966-2975. 
• Dr. Gordon Sarty, Head of Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Tel. 306-
966-2321 
 
It is possible that thinking about a specific crime, and remembering the event and your emotions 
about it, might be upsetting for you. If this study has caused you any emotional distress, please let 
us know.  We will inform the on-shift correctional officer and your case manager at the institution. 
You may also wish to seek out the chapel, or an Aboriginal Liaison Officer or Elder for support.  
 












People who have committed a violent crime can remember the event in different 
ways. Some people have memories of parts of the crime that just pop into their 
head when they do not want them to. These are usually of specific moments from 
before, during or after the incident that somehow got stuck in their head and 
keep coming back. These thoughts are of part of what actually happened at the 
time, rather than your thoughts about what has happened since, such as being 
in prison because of the crime.  
 
1. Do you sometimes get such unwanted thoughts of a crime you committed?    
                          YES or NO 
 
2. Think of a crime you committed  
 If YES to the question about think about the criminal event that keeps 
popping into your head 
 If NO to the question above, just think about a crime that has been the most 
important for you 
 
3. Take a minute now to think, and let me know once you have it in your 
mind 
4. What kind of offence was it? 
5. What do you call this event? 
 
6. Remember it, and keep it in mind as you answer all the questions 
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Appendix F: Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) 
On _____________ you experienced ______________________________________ 
        (Date)              (Significant event/offence) 
 
Below is a list of comments made by people after significant life events.  Now keeping in mind 
_______ please circle a number for each item indicating how frequently these comments were true 
for you during the past 7 days or other agreed time period.  If they did not occur during that time, 
please circle the "not at all" (0) 
 
  0 







1.  I thought about it when I didn't mean to  0 1 3 5 
2.  I avoided letting myself get upset when I 
thought about it or was reminded of it 
0 1 3 5 
3.  I tried to remove it from memory 0 1 3 5 
4.  I had trouble falling asleep or staying asleep, 
because of pictures or thoughts about it that 
came into my mind 
0 1 3 5 
5.  I had waves of strong feelings about it 0 1 3 5 
6.  I had dreams about it 0 1 3 5 
7.  I stayed away from reminders of it 0 1 3 5 
8.  I felt as if it hadn't happened or it wasn't real 0 1 3 5 
9.  I tried not to talk about it 0 1 3 5 
10.  Pictures about it popped into my mind 0 1 3 5 
11.  Other things kept making me think about it 0 1 3 5 
12.  I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings 
about it, but I didn't deal with them 
0 1 3 5 
13.  I tried not to think about it 0 1 3 5 
14.  Any reminder brought back feelings about it 0 1 3 5 
15.  My feelings about it were kind of numb   0 1 3 5 
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Appendix G: Autobiographical Memories Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 
2008; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) 
 
Below is a list of statements related to ________  that you identified at the beginning of the 
questionnaire. Please circle a number for each item indicating how true these are for you. 
 
  1 






As clearly as if it were 
happening right now 
1.  While remembering the 
event, I can see it in my 
mind.  (See) 
1 3 5 7 
2.  While remembering the 
event, I know the setting 
where it occurred 
(Setting) 
1 3 5 7 
3.  While remembering the 
event, I can hear it in my 
mind.  (Hear) 
1 3 5 7 
4.  While remembering the 
event, I can smell it.  
(Smell) 
1 3 5 7 
 
  1 






As much as 
any memory 
5.  The memory changed 
my mood. (Mood 
change) 
 
1 3 5 7 
6.  It comes to me in 
words or in pictures as 
a coherent story. 
(Story) 
1 3 5 7 
7.  My memory comes to 
me in pieces with 
missing bits. (Pieces) 
1 3 5 7 
8.  The event in my 
memory is a central 
part of my life story. 
(Life story) 
1 3 5 7 
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9.  Since it happened, I have 
thought or talked about 
this event. (Rehearsal) 
1 




As often as any 




events in my 
life 
10.  This memory has come to me out of 








11.  Was this memory cued by 
the environment, 
thoughts, a mix, or 


























While remembering the 
event, the memory is 
distressing to me 
(distressing) 
1 3 5 7 
13.  These memories persist 
even when I try to push 
them out of my mind 
(persistent) 
1 3 5 7 
14.  These memories reoccur 
in mind a number of 
times 
(recurrent) 
1 3 5 7 
15.  While remembering the 
event, I feel as though I 
am reliving it.  
(Reliving) 




Appendix H: Emotional Experiences Questionnaire – Phenomenological characteristics 
(EEQ; Porter & Birt, 2001) 
 
Please think back upon _______ that you had identified at the beginning of the questionnaire, 
and answer the following questions in an honest and sincere way. 
 
1. Stress Ratings 
 
Indicate the level 
of stress 
associated with 













2. Sensory Component 
When you remember the thoughts:   
Do you see anything in the memory Yes No 
Do you hear anything in the memory Yes No 
Do you smell anything in the memory Yes No 
Do you touch anything in the memory Yes No 
Do you taste anything in the memory Yes No 
 
3. Vantage Point 
When you remember the memory, 
can you see yourself in the 
memory image? 
Yes No Not sure 
Please specify:  
 
1 
I can never see 





changes so that 
I can see myself 
in the memory 
image only some 
of the time 
3 
I can always see 





Appendix I: Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & 
Orsillo, 1999) 
 
We are interested in the kind of thoughts which you may have had after you experienced ________.  
Below are a number of statements that may or may not be representative of your thinking.  Please 
read each statement carefully and tell us how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with each 
statement.  People react to significant events in many different ways. There are no right or wrong 
answers to these statements. 
 






















1.  The event 
happened 
because of the 
way I acted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.  I can't trust 
that I will do 
the right 
thing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  I am a weak 
person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  I will not be 
able to control 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  I can't deal 
with even the 
slightest 
upset. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.  I used to be a 
happy person 
but now I am 
always 
miserable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.  People can't 
be trusted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8.  I have to be 
on guard all 
the time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9.  I feel dead 
inside. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12.  I am 
inadequate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13.  If I think 
about the 
event, I will 
not be able to 
handle it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14.  The event 
happened 
because of the 
sort of person 
I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15.  My reactions 
since the 
event mean 
that I am 
going crazy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16.  I will never be 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17.  The world is a 
dangerous 
place. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18.  Somebody 
else would 
have stopped 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20.  I feel like an 
object, not 
like a person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22.  I can't rely on 
other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23.  I feel isolated 
and set apart 
from others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24.  I have no 
future. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26.  People are not 
what they 
seem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28.  There is 
something 
wrong with 
me as a 
person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29.  My reactions 
since the 
event show 
that I am a 
lousy coper. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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30.  There is 
something 
about me that 
made the 
event happen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32.   I can't rely on 
myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33.  Nothing good 
can happen to 
me anymore.  





Appendix J: Trauma-Related Shame Inventory (TRSI; Øktedalen, Hagtvet, Hoffart, 
Langkaas, & Smucker, 2014) 
 
Individuals who experience significant events/offences often have many different types of 
reactions. Below are a number of statements that describe thoughts and feelings that people 
sometimes have about themselves.  Please read each statement carefully, and decide how much it 
applies to you check the option that best describes how much the statement is true for you over the 
past week.  
  0 




true of me 
2 
Mostly 
true of me 
3 
Completely 
true of me 
1.  As a result of my _________, I have 
lost respect for myself  
0 1 2 3 
2.  Because of what happened, others find 
me less desirable  
0 1 2 3 
3.  I am ashamed of myself because of 
what happened  
0 1 2 3 
4.  As a result of my _________, others 
have seen parts of me that they want 
nothing to do with 
0 1 2 3 
5.  As a result of my _________, I cannot 
accept myself  
0 1 2 3 
6.  If others knew what happened, they 
would view me as inferior  
0 1 2 3 
7.  If others knew what happened, they 
would be disgusted with me  
0 1 2 3 
8.  I am ashamed of the way I behaved 
during my _________ 
0 1 2 3 
9.  I am so ashamed of what happened that 
I sometimes want to escape from 
myself 
0 1 2 3 
10.  As a result of my _________, I find 
myself less desirable  
0 1 2 3 
11.  I am ashamed of the way I felt during 
my _________.  
0 1 2 3 
12.  If others knew what had happened, they 
would look down on me  
0 1 2 3 
13.  As a result of my _________, there are 
parts of me that I want to get rid of 
0 1 2 3 
14.  If others knew what happened, they 
would not like me  
0 1 2 3 
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15.  Because of my _________, I feel 
inferior to others  
0 1 2 3 
16.  If others knew what happened, they 
would be ashamed of me  
0 1 2 3 
17.  If others knew what happened, they 
would find me unacceptable  
0 1 2 3 
18.  As a result of my _________ , a part of 
me has been exposed that others find 
shameful 
0 1 2 3 
19.  If others knew how I behaved during 
my _________, they would be ashamed 
of me 
0 1 2 3 
20.  My _________ has revealed a part of 
me that I am ashamed of  
0 1 2 3 
21.  As a result of my _________, I don’t 
like myself  
0 1 2 3 
22.  If others knew how I felt during my 
_________, they would be ashamed of 
me 
0 1 2 3 
23.  Because of what happened, I am 
disgusted with myself  
0 1 2 3 
24.  I am so ashamed of what happened that 
I sometimes want to become invisible 
to others 




Appendix K: Gudjonsson Blame Attribution Inventory – Revised – Guilt Feeling 
Attribution Subscale (GBAI-R; Gudjonsson & Singh, 1989) 
 
Please think back to _______ that you had identified at the beginning of this questionnaire, and 
answer the statements below describing your thoughts and feelings about yourself in relation to 
this offence. 
 



















Strongly     
Agree 
1.  I feel very ashamed of the crime I 
committed  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.  I am constantly troubled by my 
conscience for the crime I committed  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  I will never forgive myself for the crime I 
committed  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  *I feel no remorse or guilt for the crime I 
committed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  It is definitely not in my nature to commit 
crimes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.  The crime I committed was very much 
out of character  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.  I hate myself for the crime I committed  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8.  I am better off because I was caught3  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9.  I constantly have the urge to punish 
myself for the crime I committed  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10.  I fear that people will never accept me 
because of the crime I committed  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11.  *I have no need to feel ashamed of what I 
did  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                 





12.  *I feel annoyed that I was caught  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13.  *There is no such thing as an innocent 
victim in my case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14.  *I should not punish myself for what I did  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15.  I have no serious regrets about what I did  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16.  I would very much like to make amends 
for what I did 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17.  I sometimes have nightmares about the 
crime I committed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18.  I deserve to be severely punished for the 
crime I committed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
*Items reverse coded – higher scores  reflecting more guilt
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Appendix L: Instrumentality-Reactivity of the Offence Questionnaire (I-ROQ) 
 
Please think back upon _______ that you had identified at the beginning of the questionnaire, and 
answer the degree to which you DISAGREE or AGREE with the following statements.  There are 
no right or wrong answers to these statements, so please answer them in an honest and sincere 
way.  










1.  *The offence was planned  1 2 3 4 5 
2.  *I had a goal in my when I 
committed the offence (I 
was trying to achieve 
something) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  The event was out of my 
control 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.  My offence was largely 
motivated by emotions in 
the moment 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.  I was provoked by the 
victim  
1 2 3 4 5 
6.  *I offended because had the 
opportunity to gain 
something from it (e.g., 
money, sex, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.  My feelings were out of my 
control 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.  I offended because the 
victim aggravated me 
1 2 3 4 5 
9.  *The victim was a stranger 
(I had never met them 
before) 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.  I could not control my 
thoughts 
1 2 3 4 5 
11.  *The event/offence 
happened just the way I had 
planned it 














12.  Angry 1 2 3 4 5 
13.  Frustrated  1 2 3 4 5 
14.  Hatred 1 2 3 4 5 
15.  Insulted 1 2 3 4 5 
16.  Impulsive 1 2 3 4 5 
17.  Helpless 1 2 3 4 5 
18.  Sad 1 2 3 4 5 
19.  Betrayed 1 2 3 4 5 
20.  Inferior 1 2 3 4 5 
21.  *Happy 1 2 3 4 5 
22.  Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
23.  Embarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 
24.  Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
25.  *Calm  1 2 3 4 5 
 










----------- Scale not included due to Copyright Restrictions --------- 
 
Items are representative of, and related to, the features outlined in the Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised (Hare, 2003).  The SRP scales were organically designed to assess the four facets of 
psychopathy (Hare & Neumann, 2008), specifically interpersonal manipulation; affective 
callousness; an erratic lifestyle; and overt antisociality.  Participants were asked to rate the extent 
to which they agree with various statements about themselves using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 




Appendix N: Trauma Symptom Check-list 40 (TSC-40; Briere, 1996)) 
 
How often have you experienced each of the following in the last two months?   
   
  Never   Often 
1.  Headaches 0 1 2 3 
2.  Insomnia (trouble getting to sleep) 0 1 2 3 
3.  Weight loss (without dieting) 0 1 2 3 
4.  Stomach problems 0 1 2 3 
5.  Sexual problems 0 1 2 3 
6.  Feeling isolated from others 0 1 2 3 
7.  "Flashbacks" (sudden, vivid, distracting memories) 0 1 2 3 
8.  Restless sleep 0 1 2 3 
9.  Low sex drive 0 1 2 3 
10.  Anxiety attacks 0 1 2 3 
11.  Sexual overactivity 0 1 2 3 
12.  Loneliness 0 1 2 3 
13.  Nightmares 0 1 2 3 
14.  "Spacing out" (going away in your mind) 0 1 2 3 
15.  Sadness 0 1 2 3 
16.  Dizziness 0 1 2 3 
17.  Not feeling satisfied with your sex life 0 1 2 3 
18.  Trouble controlling your temper   0 1 2 3 
19.  Waking up early in the morning and can't get back to 
sleep 
0 1 2 3 
20.  Uncontrollable crying 0 1 2 3 
21.  Fear of men 0 1 2 3 
22.  Not feeling rested in the morning 0 1 2 3 
23.  Having sex that you didn't enjoy 0 1 2 3 
24.  Trouble getting along with others 0 1 2 3 
25.  Memory problems 0 1 2 3 
26.  Desire to physically hurt yourself   0 1 2 3 
 135 
 
27.  Fear of women 0 1 2 3 
28.  Waking up in the middle of the night 0 1 2 3 
29.  Bad thoughts or feelings during sex 0 1 2 3 
30.  Passing out 0 1 2 3 
31.  Feeling that things are "unreal” 0 1 2 3 
32.  Unnecessary or over-frequent washing 0 1 2 3 
33.  Feelings of inferiority 0 1 2 3 
34.  Feeling tense all the time 0 1 2 3 
35.  Being confused about your sexual feelings 0 1 2 3 
36.  Desire to physically hurt others 0 1 2 3 
37.  Feelings of guilt 0 1 2 3 
38.  Feelings that you are not always in your body 0 1 2 3 
39.  Having trouble breathing 0 1 2 3 
40.  Sexual feelings when you shouldn't have them 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix O: Demographic Information  
 
1. Age:  
 
2. Race:  
 
3. Education Level:  
 
4. Mental health diagnosis:  
      
      
 
5. Index offence:  
 
6. Institutional or community violence:  





Appendix P: Correlations Controlling for Trauma Symptoms 
Table P.1  
Partial Correlations between Intrusive Memories, Shame, Guilt, Instrumentality-Reactivity, and 

































Instrumentality -- -- -- -.10 
(-.04) 
Note: Values in brackets are correlations before partialling out trauma symptoms 
*p < .05, **p < .001 
 
 
